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Abstract
When a researcher wishes to use multiple instrumental variables for a single binary treatment,
the familiar LATE monotonicity assumption can become restrictive: it requires that all units share
a common direction of response even when different instruments are shifted in opposing directions.
What I call vector monotonicity, by contrast, simply restricts treatment status to be monotonic in
each instrument separately. This is a natural assumption in many contexts, capturing the intuitive
notion of “no defiers” for each instrument. I show that in a setting with a binary treatment and mul-
tiple discrete instruments, a class of causal parameters is point identified under vector monotonicity,
including the average treatment effect among units that are responsive to any particular subset of the
instruments. I propose a simple “2SLS-like” estimator for the family of identified treatment effect
parameters. An empirical application revisits the labor market returns to college education.
1 Introduction
The local average treatment effects (LATE) framework introduced by Imbens and An-
grist (1994) allows for causal inference with arbitrary heterogeneity in treatment effects,
but in doing so imposes an important form of homogeneity on selection behavior. This
homogeneity comes through the LATE monotonicity assumption, which is often quite
natural to make when the researcher has a single instrumental variable at their disposal.
However with multiple instruments, this traditional monotonicity assumption can become
hard to justify – a point that has recently been emphasized by Mogstad et al. (2020b).
A natural question is whether causal effects are still identified when monotonicity
holds on an instrument-by-instrument basis, what I call vector monotonicity. Vector
monotonicity (VM) captures the notion that each instrument has an impact on treatment
uptake in a direction that is common across units (and typically known ex-ante by the
researcher). For example, two instruments for college enrollment might be: i) proximity
to a college; and ii) affordability of nearby colleges. It is reasonable to assume that each
instrument induces some individuals towards going to college, while discouraging none.
This contrasts with traditional LATE monotonicity, which as I describe below requires
that either proximity or affordability effectively dominates in selection behavior for all
units.
∗I am grateful to Josh Angrist, Simon Lee, and Bernard Salanie´ for patient and insightful feedback on this project, as
well as Isaiah Andrews, Jushan Bai, Junlong Feng, Peter Hull, Jack Light, Jose´ Luis Montiel Olea, Suresh Naidu, Serena
Ng, Vitor Possebom and Alex Torgovitsky for helpful comments and discussion. I also thank attendees of the Columbia
econometrics colloquium, the 2019 Young Economists Symposium, and the 2019 Empirics and Methods in Economics
Conference for their feedback. Any errors or other shortcomings are my own.
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In this paper I provide a simple approach to estimating causal effects under vector
monotonicity. I first show that in a setting with a binary treatment and any number of
binary instruments satisfying VM, average treatment effects can be point identified for
subgroups of the population that satisfy a certain condition. The condition is met by, for
example, the group of all units that move into treatment when any fixed subset of the
instruments are switched “on”. As special cases, this includes for example those units
that respond to a movement of a single particular instrument, or those units that have any
variation whatsoever in counterfactual treatment status given the available instruments.
I show how general discrete instruments can be accommodated by re-expressing them
as a larger number of binary instruments, while preserving vector monotonicity. I then
propose a simple two-step estimator for the identified causal parameters. The estimator is
scalable, involving the same computational burden as 2SLS despite the rapid proliferation
of possible selection patterns compatible with VM as the number of instruments increases.
To appreciate the sense in which traditional LATE monotonicity is restrictive with
multiple instruments, consider the two instruments for college mentioned above, with
each coded as a binary variable (“far”/“close” and “cheap”/“expensive”). LATE mono-
tonicity says that a counterfactual change to the proximity and/or tuition instruments
can either move some students into college attendance, or some students out, but not
both. In particular, this requires that all units who would go to college when it is far
but cheap would also go to college if it was close and expensive, or that the reverse is
true. We would generally expect this implication to fail if individuals are heterogeneous
in how much each of the instruments “matters” to them: for example, if some students
are primarily sensitive to distance and others are primarily sensitive to tuition. Vector
monotonicity instead says something quite natural in this context: proximity to a col-
lege weakly encourages college attendance, regardless of price, and lower tuition weakly
encourages college attendance, regardless of distance.
In a set of papers developed concurrently with this one, Mogstad, Torgovitsky and
Walters (2019; 2020a; 2020b) (henceforth MTW) underline the above difficulty for LATE
monotonicity with multiple instruments, and introduce a weaker assumption of partial
monotonicity (PM). PM is similar to VM but allows the direction of “compliance” for each
instrument to depend on the values of the others (see Section 3 for an explicit comparison).
In Mogstad et al. (2020a), MTW develop a marginal treatment effects framework for
partial monotonicity. They focus on a broad class of target causal parameters that may
be only partially identified by IV methods, or may require continuous instruments and/or
parametric assumptions for point identification. By contrast, I maintain the stronger
monotonicity assumption VM and characterize a class of causal parameters that are then
point identified with only discrete instruments and without any auxiliary assumptions. I
show that VM differs from PM by adding to it a testable condition and that this restriction
has additional identification power, expanding the set of identified parameters.
The estimator proposed in this paper can be seen as an alternative to two-stage-least-
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squares (2SLS), which has been the typical method to make use of multiple instruments in
applied work. 2SLS is known to identify a convex combination of local average treatment
effects under the standard LATE assumptions provided that the first stage recovers the
propensity score function, but this implication does not hold generally under VM or PM.
MTW derive additional testable conditions which are sufficient for the 2SLS estimand
to deliver a convex combination of treatment effects under PM, though the number of
conditions to be verified generally grows combinatorially with the number of instruments.
In the Supplemental Material,1 I consider two special cases in which linear 2SLS will un-
cover averages of causal effects under VM with binary instruments. A sufficient condition
for one of the special cases – that the instruments are independent – is straightforward to
test empirically. The other special case assumes that each unit is responsive to the value
of one instrument only, and is quite restrictive. My main identification result eliminates
the need to rely on such additional assumptions.
A growing literature has considered extensions to the basic LATE model of Imbens
and Angrist (1994), but has typically not emphasized the distinction between separate
instruments, when more than one is available. Natural analogs of LATE monotonicity
have been studied for treatments that are discrete (Angrist and Imbens, 1995), continuous
(Angrist et al., 2000), or unordered (Heckman and Pinto, 2018). Other papers have
considered identification under various violations of LATE monotonicity. In the case of
a binary treatment, Gautier and Hoderlein (2011), Lewbel and Yang (2016) and Gautier
(2020) consider various explicit selection models, while Chaisemartin (2017) shows that a
weaker notion than monotonicity can be sufficient to give a causal interpretation to LATE
estimands.2 Lee and Salanie´ (2018) relax monotonicity in a setting with multivalued
treatment and continuous instruments, generalizing results from the local instrumental
variables approach of Heckman and Vytlacil (2005). With discrete instruments, Lee and
Salanie´ (2020) show that a notion of particular instrument values “targeting” particular
values of a multivalued treatment carries additional identifying power.
In Section 2 I discuss the basic setup and definitions. I compare vector monotonicity
to the traditional monotonicity assumption and MTW’s proposal of partial monotonicity,
and discuss examples in the context of a simple choice model. In Section 3, I show that
like conventional monotonicity, VM partitions the population into well-defined “compli-
ance groups” that can coexist in arbitrary proportions. I characterize these groups in a
setting with any number of binary instruments, nesting a description from MTW of the
two-instrument case. In Section 4 I use this taxonomy to demonstrate identification of a
family of causal parameters, and Section 5 proposes corresponding estimators. Section 6
reports results from an application to the labor market returns to schooling. In appen-
dices, I consider a generalization of the identification result that relaxes an assumption
1Supplemental Material is available here: http://www.columbia.edu/~ltg2111/resources/vm_externalappendix.pdf.
2LATE monotonicity is also generally not assumed by nonseparable triangular models with endogeneity (e.g. Imbens
and Newey 2009, Torgovitsky 2015, D’Haultfœuille and Fe´vrier 2015, Gunsilius 2020, Feng 2020), which typically impose
some version of monotonicity in unobserved heterogeneity.
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of rectangular support among the instruments, consider identification with covariates,
and additional results regarding the proposed estimator, including a data-driven regular-
ization procedure to improve its performance in small samples. In online Supplemental
Material, I also consider some special cases in which linear 2SLS identifies a convex com-
bination of treatment effects under VM, and provide additional examples pertaining to
the main text, including a second empirical application to the labor supply effects of
family size.
2 Setup
Here I fix notation and formalize the basic setup in which a researcher has multiple
instrumental variables for a single binary treatment. Within this framework, I contrast
the three alternative notions of monotonicity mentioned in the introduction.
Consider a setting with a binary treatment variable D, scalar outcome variable Y ,
and vector Z = (Z1 . . . ZJ) of J instrumental variables that can take values in set Z ⊆
(Z1 ×Z2 × · · · × ZJ), where Zj is the set of values that instrument Zj can take.3
Definition 1 (potential outcomes and treatments). Let Di(z) denote the treatment
status of unit i when their vector of instrumental variables takes value z ∈ Z, and Yi(d, z)
the realization of the outcome variable that would occur with treatment status d ∈ {0, 1}
and instrument value z ∈ Z.
The following assumption states that the available instrumental variables are valid:
Assumption 1 (exclusion and independence). a) Yi(d, z) = Yi(d) for all z
′ ∈ Z, d ∈
{0, 1}; and b)
(Yi(1), Yi(0), {Di(z)}z∈Z) ⊥ (Z1i, . . . , ZJi)
The first part of Assumption 1 states that the instruments are “excludable” from the
outcome function in the sense that potential outcomes do not depend on them once
treatment status is fixed. The second part of Assumption 1 states that the instruments
are independent of potential outcomes and potential treatments. In practice, it is common
to maintain a version of this independence assumption that holds only conditional on a
set of observed covariates. For ease of exposition, I implicitly condition on any such
covariates throughout, then consider incorporating them explicitly in Appendix B and in
the empirical application
2.1 Notions of monotonicity
It is well-known that when treatment effects are heterogeneous, Assumption 1 alone is not
sufficient for instrument variation to identify treatment effects. The seminal LATE model
of Imbens and Angrist (1994) introduces the additional assumption of monotonicity:
3Z may be a strict subset of (Z1 × Z2 × · · · × ZJ ) when certain combinations of instrument values are ruled out on
conceptual grounds, e.g. Z1 indicates a mothers’ first two births being girls and Z2 indicates them both being boys.
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Assumption IAM (traditional LATE monotonicity). For all z, z′ ∈ Z: P (Di(z) ≥
Di(z
′)) = 1 or P (Di(z) ≤ Di(z′)) = 1.
I follow the terminology of MTW and henceforth refer to this as Assumption IAM, or
“Imbens and Angrist monotonicity”. As pointed out by Heckman et al. (2006), IAM can
be thought of as a type of uniformity assumption: it states that flows of selection into
treatment between z in z′ move only in one direction, whichever direction that is.
The proposed assumption of vector monotonicity captures monotonicity as the notion
that “increasing” the value of any instrument weakly encourages (or discourages) all units
to take treatment, regardless of the values of the other instruments:
Assumption 2 (vector monotonicity). There exists an ordering ≥j on Zj for each
j ∈ {1 . . . J} such that for all z, z′ ∈ Z, if z ≥ z′ component-wise according to the {≥j},
then Di(z) ≥ Di(z′) with probability one.
Vector monotonicity is referred to as “actual monotonicity” by Mogstad et al. (2020b),
when each ≥j is the standard ordering on real numbers. Mountjoy (2019) imposes a
version of VM in a case with a multivalued treatment and continuous instruments.
The partial monotonicity assumption introduced by MTW is weaker than both IAM
and VM. Let (zj, z−j) denote a vector composed of zj ∈ Zj and z−j ∈ Z−j, where Z−j
indicates the set of values that the vector of all instruments but Zj can take.
Assumption PM (partial monotonicity). For each j ∈ {1 . . . J}, zj, z′j ∈ Zj, and
z−j ∈ Z−j such that (zj, z−j) ∈ Z and (z′j, z−j) ∈ Z, either Di(zj, z−j) ≥ Di(z′j, z−j) with
probability one or Di(zj, z−j) ≤ Di(z′j, z−j) with probability one.
Note that under partial monotonicity, there will be a weak ordering on the points in Zj,
for any fixed choice of j and z−j. The crucial restriction made by vector monotonicity
beyond partial monotonicity is that under VM, this ordering must be the same across
all values of z−j ∈ Z−j for a given j. Partial monotonicity could for example capture
a situation in which college proximity encourages attendance when nearby colleges are
cheap but discourages attendance when they are expensive – while VM could not.
An alternative characterization of VM makes this relationship to PM more explicit.
Call Z connected when for any two z, z′ ∈ Z there exists a sequence of vectors z1, . . . , zm
with z1 = z, zm = z
′ and each zm and zm−1 differing on only one component, and such
that zm ∈ Z for all m.4
Proposition 1. Let Z be connected. Then VM holds iff for each j ∈ {1 . . . J} there is
an ordering ≥j on Zj such that P (Di(zj, z−j) ≥ Di(z′j, z−j)) = 1 when zj ≥j z′j, for all
z−j ∈ Z−j such that both (zj, z−j) ∈ Z and (z′j, z−j) ∈ Z.
Proof. See Appendix D.
4This rules out cases where Z is disjoint with respect to such chains of single-instrument switches, for example in a case
of two binary instruments if Z consists only of the points (0, 0) and (1, 1). With this Z, PM and VM are both vacuous.
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The additional restriction made by VM over PM is empirically testable, by inspecting
the propensity score function:
Proposition 2. Suppose PM and Assumption 1 hold, and Z is connected. Then VM
holds if and only if E[Di|Zi = z] is component-wise monotonic in z, for some fixed
ordering j on each Zj.
Proof. See Appendix D.
By contrast, PM is compatible with any propensity score function. Note that if Assump-
tion 1 holds conditional on covariates Xi, Proposition 2 also need only hold with respect
to the conditional propensity score E[Di|Zi = z,Xi = x] (see Section 6).
Since IAM implies PM, it follows as a corollary to Proposition 2 that if IAM and
Assumption 1 hold and E[Di|Zi = z] is component-wise monotonic in z, then VM holds.
This establishes that if a researcher has verified that the propensity score function is
monotonic, VM becomes a strictly weaker assumption than IAM. The relationship among
Assumptions IAM, VM and PM is depicted graphically in Figure 1.
VM IAM
PM
(a) (b)(d)
(c)
(e)
VM=PM
IAM
Without restriction on the propensity score When propensity score is monotonic
Figure 1: Left panel shows ex-ante comparison of Imbens & Angrist monotonicity (IAM), vector monotonicity
(VM), and partial monotonicity (PM) before the propensity score function is known. Right panel depicts the
relationship when the propensity score is component-wise monotonic: PM and VM become identical, with IAM
a special case. Examples for points (a)-(e) are discussed in Table 1.
Examples of the points (a)-(e) in Figure 1 can be made more concrete by considering
a case with two binary instruments Z = {0, 1} × {0, 1}, with an explicit selection model
of the form:
Di(z1, z2) = 1(β0i + β1iz1 + β2iz2 + β3iz1z2 ≥ 0) (1)
where βi = (β0i, β1i, β2i, β3i)
′ ⊥ Zi (Assumption 1). Given the binary treatments, this
model is general enough to capture all possible selection functions Di(z).
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Case Example of support restriction on β’s Implied restrictions on selection
(a) β1, β2, β3 homogeneous; 0 ≤ β1 ≤ β2, β3 = 0 Di(0, 0) ≤ Di(1, 0) ≤ Di(0, 1) ≤ Di(1, 1)
(b) β1, β2, β3 homogeneous; −β2 ≤ β3 ≤ −β1 ≤ 0 Di(0, 0) ≤ Di(1, 0) ≤ Di(1, 1) ≤ Di(0, 1)
(c) β2i ≥ β1i ≥ 0,−β2i ≤ β3i ≤ −β1i for all i
Di(0, 0) ≤ Di(0, 1); Di(0, 0) ≤ Di(1, 0);
Di(1, 0) ≤ Di(1, 1); Di(1, 1) ≤ Di(0, 1)
(d)
β3i = 0, β1i ≥ 0, β2i ≥ 0 for all i
P (β2i < −β0i ≤ β1i) > 0, P (β1i < −β0i ≤ β2i) > 0
Di(0, 0) ≤ Di(0, 1) ≤ Di(1, 1);
Di(0, 0) ≤ Di(1, 0) ≤ Di(1, 1)
e) a neighborhood of the zero vector in R4 none
Table 1: Illustrative examples of each of the cases (a)-(e) in the random coefficients selection model Eq. (1).
Equation (1) could capture a utility maximization model in which individuals trade
off an incentive β1iz1 + β2iz2 + β3iz1z2 produced by the instruments against a net cost
−β0i of treatment. Table 1 discusses restrictions on the support of the components of βi
that illustrate each of the points (a)-(e) in Figure 1. In all examples, the cost β0i can
be heterogeneous across individuals, but examples (c)-(e) represent threshold crossing
models in which heterogeneity in Di(z) is not linearly separable from z. This is similar
to a setup considered by MTW, with a slightly different notation.
Now consider the plausibility of the above cases in the returns to schooling example,
with “cheap” and “close” the 1 states of Z1 and Z2, respectively. In a utility maximization
model β0i might denote the net benefit of attending college when it is far and expensive.
If college then became either cheap or close, it is natural to expect this to only increase
the net benefit of college, incenting some individuals into enrolling while discouraging
none. This motivates making the restrictions β1i ≥ 0 and β2i ≥ 0. If we then imagine
changing to (cheap, close) from either (expensive, close) or (cheap, far), it’s reasonable
to again assume that all students would move weakly towards college, unless there are
individuals for whom the interaction coefficient β3i is sufficiently strong and negative.
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Finally, note that a sufficient condition for the restriction from PM to VM is the
existence of groups that are sensitive to that instrument alone. For example, suppose
Alice only cares about proximity, and Bob only cares about tuition, with:
Dalice(z1, z2) = 1(z2 = close) and Dbob(z1, z2) = 1(z1 = cheap)
Partial monotonicity then requires that the directions of “compliance” that Alice and
Bob exhibit (lower distance and lower tuition, respectively) hold (weakly) for all other
units in the population, which then implies VM.6 Further, the existence of both Alice
and Bob imply that IAM is violated.7
5It is possible to imagine scenarios in which this could happen: for example, suppose there exist students who do not
want to live with their parents during college, and feel that they will have to if attending a college near their parents’
home. Accordingly, some such students might go to college only when it is cheap and far. Note that in this case, PM would
then require that there be no other individuals in the population that go to college only if it is both cheap and close. The
Supplemental Material provides a taxonomy of such cases that break VM but not PM, as point (c) does, with two binary
instruments.
6That is, Dalice(1, z2) > Dalice(0, z2) for all z2 ∈ Z2 implies through PM that P (Di(1, z2) ≥ Di(0, z2)) = 1 for all
z2 ∈ Z2, and similarly Bob implies that P (Di(z1, 1) ≥ Di(z1, 0)) = 1 for all z1 ∈ Z1.
7Strictly speaking, both of these implications require that there are groups of positive probability with respect to the
7
It is also illustrative to consider an example of this sufficient condition failing to hold.
MTW offer an example where PM holds without VM, in which we consider a population
of families having two or more kids (following Angrist and Evans 1998), and take as two
binary instruments for having a third child indicators for the sex of the first and second
child. If selection into a third child is driven uniformly by considerations of having at
least one child of each sex, then no parents would respond solely to the sex of one of
the first two children alone. This violates VM since whether or not the first child being
female encourages or discourages treatment depends on the sex of the second child (and
vice versa). However, I note that the instruments in this example can be recoded such
that VM holds given the same assumptions about underlying selection behavior (see
Supplemental Material for an example).
3 Characterizing compliance under vector monotonicity
In this section I show that the assumption of vector monotonicity partitions the popula-
tion of interest into a set of well-defined “compliance groups”. These groups generalize
the familiar taxonomy of always-takers, never-takers, and compliers from the case of a
single binary instrument. Providing a characterization of the groups will be necessary to
state the main identification result in Section 4.
To simplify notation, let us define a random variable Gi corresponding to an individ-
ual’s entire vector of counterfactual treatments {Di(z)}z∈Z . For example, with a single
binary instrument Gi = “always-taker” indicates that Di(0) = Di(1) = 1. Gi will be
referred to as unit i’s “compliance group”. Compliance groups partition individuals in
the population based on upon their selection behavior under all counterfactual values of
the instruments. Let G be the support of Gi. We can think of VM as a restriction on
which compliance groups are allowed in the population, or equivalently a restriction on
G. As a final bit of notation, we will denote as Dg(z) the potential treatments function
Di(z) that is common to all units sharing a value g of Gi.
3.1 With two binary instruments
We first turn to the simplest case of two binary instruments, in which G can be seen to
contain six distinct compliance groups.
Normalize the instrument value labeled “1” for each instrument to be the direction in
which potential treatments are increasing. Table 2 describes the six compliance groups
that can occur under VM with two binary instruments, with names introduced for each
by MTW. A Z1 complier, for example, goes to college if and only if college is cheap,
regardless of whether it is close. A Z2 complier, in our example, would go to college if
and only if college is close, regardless of whether it is cheap. A reluctant complier is
“reluctant” in the sense that they require college to be both cheap and close to attend,
population distribution that have the same selection patterns as Alice and Bob do.
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while an eager complier goes to college so long as it is either cheap or close. Never and
always takers are defined in the same way as they are under IAM: maxz∈Z Di(z) = 0 and
minz∈Z Di(z) = 1, respectively.
Name Di(0,0) Di(0,1) Di(1,0) Di(1,1)
never takers N N N N
always takers T T T T
Z1 compliers N N T T
Z2 compliers N T N T
eager compliers N T T T
reluctant compliers N N N T
Table 2: The six compliance groups under VM with two binary instruments.
A natural question is whether the sizes pg := P (Gi = g) of the six groups in Ta-
ble 2 can be detected empirically. In general, only two of them are point identified.
Let P (z) := E[Di|Zi = z] =
∑
g∈G pgDg(z) be the propensity score function, where
the second equality follows from Assumption 1. From the definitions in Table 2, it is
clear that pn.t = 1 − P (1, 1) and pa.t. = P (0, 0). For the others, we can identify cer-
tain linear combinations of the group occupancies, e.g. P (1, 0) − P (0, 0) = pZ1 + peager,
P (0, 1)−P (0, 0) = pZ2 + peager, and P (1, 1)−P (0, 1) = pZ1 + preluctant. This allows us to
bound each of the four remaining group sizes, given that each must be positive. For exam-
ple, {P (1, 0)− P (0, 0)} − {P (1, 1)− P (0, 1)} ≤ peager ≤ min{P (0, 1)− P (0, 0), P (1, 0)−
P (0, 0)}. The point identified linear combinations are in fact special cases of the general
identification results developed later in Section 4.1 (see Corollary 2 to Theorem 1).
3.2 With multiple binary instruments
Now we see how the two-instrument case generalizes to a case where the researcher has any
number of binary instruments. While the overall number of compliance groups explodes
combinatorially, we can still keep track of the various groups in a systematic way.
Let there be J binary instruments Z1 . . . ZJ . I focus on the baseline case in which
the space of conceivable instrument values is rectangular: Z = {0, 1}J (see Supplemental
Material for some alternatives). We wish to characterize the subset of the 22
J
possible
mappings between vectors of instrument values and treatment that satisfy VM, where
we continue to normalize the “1” state for each Zj to be the direction in which poten-
tial treatments are weakly increasing.8 The number of such compliance groups Gi as a
function of J is equal to the number of isotone boolean functions on J variables, which
8This “up” value for each instrument will be taken in our results to be known ex ante. In practice, this might follow
from a maintained natural hypothesis, such as that lower price encourages rather than discourages college attendance.
However, the directions are also empirically identified from the propensity score function (see Proposition 2).
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is known to follow the so-called Dedekind sequence (Kisielewicz, 1988):9
3, 6, 20, 168, 7581, 7828354 . . .
Let DedJ denote the J
th number in the Dedekind sequence.
One group that always satisfies VM are those units for whom Di(z) = 0 for all values
z ∈ Z: so-called never-takers. Each of the other groups can be associated with a collection
of minimal combinations of instruments that are sufficient for that unit to take treatment.
For example, in a setting with three instruments, one compliance group would be the units
that take treatment if either Z1 = 1, or if Z2 = Z3 = 1. By vector monotonicity, then,
any unit in this group must also take treatment if Z1 = Z2 = Z3 = 1. However, another
group of units might take treatment only if Z1 = Z2 = Z3 = 1. This group is more
“reluctant” than the former. The group of always-takers are the least “reluctant”: they
require no instruments to equal one in order for them to take treatment.
By this logic, we can associate compliance groups (aside from never-takers) with fam-
ilies F of subsets S ⊆ {1 . . . J} of the instrument labels. However, we need only consider
families for which no element S of the family is a subset of some other S ′: so-called
Sperner families (see e.g. Kleitman and Milner 1973). Families that are not Sperner
would be redundant under VM, since in the example above S ′ could be dropped without
affecting the implied selection function Di(z).
Definition 2 (compliance group for a Sperner family). For any Sperner family
F , let g(F ) denote the compliance group in which units take treatment if and only ifs
zj = 1 for all j in S, for at least one S in F. Denote the Sperner family associated with
a compliance group g as F (g).
All together, the compliance groups satisfying VM with J binary instruments are as
follows: the never-takers group, along with DedJ − 1 further groups g(F ) corresponding
to each of the distinct Sperner families F of instrument labels.
In the simplest example of the above, when J = 1, vector monotonicity coincides
with PM and IAM, and the Sperner families corresponding to this single instrument are
simply the null set and the singleton {1}: corresponding to always-takers and compliers,
respectively. Together with never-takers, we have the familiar three groups from LATE
analysis with a single binary instrument.
For J = 2, the five groups (aside from never takers) described in the previous section
9An analytical expression for the Dedekind numbers is given by Kisielewicz (1988), but only the first eight have been
calculated numerically due to the computational burden. Yet while the Dedekind numbers explode quite rapidly, they
do so much more slowly than the total number 22
J
of boolean functions of J variables. For example while 3/4 = 75%
of conceivable compliance groups for J = 1 satisfy VM, only 20/256 ≈ 7.8% do for J = 3, and just 7581/4294967296 ≈
1.7 ∗ 10−4 do for J = 5. Thus the “bite” of VM is increasing with J , in the sense that it rules out a larger and larger
fraction of conceivable selection patterns.
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map to Sperner families as follows:
F name of GF
∅ “always takers”
{1} “Z1 compliers”
{2} “Z2 compliers”
{1}, {2} “eager compliers”
{1, 2} “reluctant compliers”
The rapidly expanding richness of selection behavior compatible with VM can be seen
with J = 3, where there are 19 Sperner families, each indicated within bold brackets:
{∅},{1},{2},{3},
{1, 2},{1, 3},{2, 3},{1, 2, 3},
{{1}, {2}},{{2}, {3}},{{1}, {3}},{{1}, {2}, {3}},
{{1, 2}, {3}},{{1, 3}, {2}},{{2, 3}, {1}},
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}},{{1, 2}, {2, 3}},{{1, 3}, {2, 3}},
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}
For instance, an individual with Gi corresponding to {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} takes treat-
ment so long as any two instruments take the one value.
A central feature of the identification analysis will be that the selection functions
corresponding to the various compliance groups are not all linearly independent from one
another. Only 2J such functions can be independent (though DedJ is strictly larger for
J > 1), since any function of binary variables can be written as a polynomial in them.
Let Gc := G/{a.t., n.t.} denote the set of DedJ − 2 compliance groups compatible with
Assumption VM that are not never-takers or always takers. All of the groups in Gc can
be thought of as generalized “compliers” of some kind: units that vary treatment uptake
in some way across possible instrument values.
A natural basis for the set of selection functions {Dg(z)}g∈Gc can be formed by con-
sidering functions that are products over a single subset of the instruments
zS :=
∏
j∈S
zj = 1 (zj = 1 for all j in S)
where S ⊆ {1 . . . J}, S 6= ∅.10 For a given set S, zS yields the selection function Dg(S)(z)
of the compliance group g(S) corresponding to the Sperner family consisting only of the
set S. I refer to such compliance groups g(S) as simple.
For J = 2, the selection functions for the simple compliance groups are:
DZ1(z) = z1 DZ2(z) = z2 Dreluctant(z) = z1z2
10Note that a similar construction plays a central role in Lee and Salanie´, 2018.
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The selection function for the remaining group, eager compliers, can be obtained as:
Deager(z) = z1 + z2 − z1z2 = DZ1(z) +DZ2(z)−Dreluctant(z)
We can express this linear dependency by the matrix MJ in the system:
DZ1(z)
DZ2(z)
Dreluctant(z)
Deager(z)
 =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
1 1 −1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=M2
 DZ1(z)DZ2(z)
Dreluctant(z)
 (2)
For general J , we define the matrix MJ from the analogous system of equations:
{Dg(F )(z)}F : g(F )∈Gc = MJ{Dg(S)(z)}S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
for all z ∈ Z. The rows of matrix MJ are indexed by Sperner families (corresponding to
the groups in Gc), and the columns by the simple Sperner families for non-null S. The
entries of MJ are given by the following expression:
11
Proposition 3. [MJ ]F,S′ =
∑
f∈s(F,S′)(−1)|f |+1 where s(F, S ′) :=
{
f ⊆ F :
(⋃
S∈f S
)
= S ′
}
.
Proof. See Appendix D.
3.3 Vector monotonicity with discrete instruments
More generally, when the researcher has discrete instrumental variables that satisfy vector
monotonicity, they can be re-expressed as a larger number of binary instruments in a way
that preserves vector monotonicity. By introducing a binary instrument for every value
but one of each discrete instrument, the analysis can be extended to this much more
general setting:
Proposition 4. Let Z1 be a discrete variable with M ordered points of support z1 < z2 <
· · · < zM , and Z2 . . . ZJ be other instrumental variables. Let Z˜mi := 1(Z1i ≥ zm). If
the vector Z = (Z1, . . . ZJ) satisfies Assumption VM on a connected Z then so does the
vector (Z˜2, . . . , Z˜M , Z2, . . . ZJ).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Applying Proposition 4 iteratively offers a fairly general recipe for mapping the instru-
ments available in a given empirical setting into the framework of binary instruments.
Note that the mapping in Proposition 3.3 introduces restrictions on Z for the resulting
binary instruments, since for example we could not have both Z˜2i = 1 and Z˜1i = 0. As a
result, not all of the compliance groups introduced in Section 3.2 are necessary to account
for, since the possible patterns of instrument variation pool some into equivalent groups.
While in the next section I assume full binary instrument support for the baseline results,
Appendix A provides the necessary generalizations to make use of Proposition 4.
11The matrix M3, which has D3 − 2 = 18 rows and 23 − 1 = 7 columns is given explicitly in the Supplemental Material.
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4 Parameters of interest and identification
In this section I define and characterize a class of causal parameters, and show that they
are generally point identified under vector monotonicity. This section maintains a setup
of J binary instruments with Z = {0, 1}J unless otherwise specified.
4.1 Main identification result
My identification analysis considers conditional averages of potential outcomes: for d ∈
{0, 1} and an arbitrary function f : θfdc = E[f(Yi(d))|Ci = 1], where Ci = c(Gi, Zi) is a
function c : G×Z → {0, 1} of individual i’s compliance group and their realization of the
instruments. Intuitively, the event Ci = 1 will indicate that unit i belongs to a certain
subgroup of generalized “compliers”. Most of the discussion will center on the class of
average treatment effects:
∆c = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Ci = 1]
which correspond to θy1c − θy0c with f(y) = y the identity function. Treatment effect
parameters having the form of ∆c are familiar both from the LATE (Imbens and Angrist,
1994) and marginal treatment effects (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005) literatures. For
instance, with a single binary instrument the LATE sets c(g, z) = 1(g = complier),
independent of z.
The main result is that identification of is possible under VM for certain choices of
the function c(g, z). In particular, it will require a condition that I call “Property M”:
Definition 3 (Property M). The function c(g, z) satisfies Property M if for all z ∈ Z:
c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0, while for every g ∈ Gc:
c(g, z) =
∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
[MJ ]F (g),S · c(g(S), z)
where the matrix MJ is defined in Proposition 3. I’ll also say that θ
fd
c or ∆c “satisfies
Property M” if its underlying function c(g, z) does. Intuition for Property M is provided
after the statement of the identification result, and an equivalent characterization of
Property M and leading examples are given in Section 4.2.
Causal parameters that satisfy Property M are identified under VM with binary in-
struments, provided the instruments provide sufficient independent variation in treatment
uptake. The latter requirement holds when the binary instruments have full (rectangular)
support:
Assumption 3 (full support). P (Zi = z) > 0 for all z ∈ {0, 1}J
Assumption 3 is stronger than is necessary but simplifies presentation – Appendix A
presents a generalization.
An alternative expression of Assumption 3 is useful for writing the identification result
explicitly. For an arbitrary ordering of the k := 2J − 1 non-empty subsets S ⊆ {1 . . . J},
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define the random vector Γi = (ZS1i . . . ZSki)
′ from products of the Zji for j within each
subset S. That is, each element of Γi indicates the treatment status of a particular simple
compliance group, given Zi. Let Σ be the covariance matrix of Γi.
Lemma 1. Assumption 3 holds if and only if Σ has full rank.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Lemma 1 reveals that full support of the instruments is equivalent to there being inde-
pendent variation in treatment takeup among all of the simple compliance groups.
We may now state the main result:
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1-3 (independence & exclusion, VM, and full support),
for any c satisfying Property M and any measurable function f(Y ) for each d ∈ {0, 1}:
θfdc = (−1)d+1
E[f(Yi)h(Zi)1(Di = d)]
E[h(Zi)Di]
,
provided that P (Ci = 1) > 0, where h(Zi) = λ
′Σ−1(Γi − E[Γi]) and
λ = (E[c(g(S1), Zi)], . . . E[c(g(Sk), Zi)])
′
Proof. See Appendix D.
It follows immediately from Theorem 1 that conditional average treatment effects
∆c = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Ci = 1] satisfying Property M are identified as:
∆c = E[h(Zi)Yi]/E[h(Zi)Di]
Note that as the numerator of ∆c depends on Zi and Yi only and the denominator depends
on Zi and Di only, identification of ∆c would hold in a “split-sample” setting where Yi
and Di are not necessarily linked in the same dataset.
We can also re-express the empirical estimand for ∆c delivered by Theorem 1 in a
more illuminating form, directly in terms of conditional expectation functions of each of
Yi and Di on the instruments:
Corollary 1. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 1:
∆c =
∑
z∈Z
(∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅ λSAS,z
)
E[Yi|Zi = z]∑
z∈Z
(∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅ λSAS,z
)
E[Di|Zi = z]
where λS is as defined in Theorem 1 and AS,z =
∑
f⊆z0
(z1∪f)=S
(−1)|f |, with (z1, z0) a partition
of the indices j ∈ {1 . . . J} that take a value of zero or one in z, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix D. The proof of Lemma 1 gives the explicit form of A for J = 2.
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Intuition for Theorem 1
The basic logic behind Theorem 1 can be appreciated by focusing on the average treat-
ment effect parameters ∆c, and observing that by Assumption 1 and the law of iterated
expectations they can be written as a weighted average over compliance-group specific
average treatment effects ∆g := E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Gi = g]:
∆c =
∑
g∈G
{
P (Gi = g)E[c(g, Zi)]
E[c(Gi, Zi)]
}
·∆g (3)
where the weights are each proportional to the quantity E[c(g, Zi)]. Now consider a gen-
eral type of “2SLS-like” estimand, in which a single scalar instrument h(Zi) is constructed
from the vector of instruments Zi according to some function h, and then used in a simple
linear IV regression.12
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1 (exclusion and independence):
Cov(Yi, h(Zi))
Cov(Di, h(Zi))
=
∑
g∈G
P (Gi = g) · Cov(Dg(Zi), h(Zi))∑
g′∈G P (Gi = g
′) · Cov(Dg′(Zi), h(Zi)) ·∆g
Proof. See the Supplemental Material for direct proof of this form.
Proposition 5 reveals that such 2SLS-like estimands also uncover a weighted average of
the ∆g, where the weight placed on each compliance group g is governed by the covariance
between Dg(Zi) and h(Zi). Comparing with Equation 3, we see that a 2SLS-like estimand
can identify ∆c if the function h is chosen in such a way that Cov(Dg(Zi), h(Zi)) =
E[c(g, Zi)] for all the compliance groups g. However, since the covariance operator is
linear, the linear dependencies examined in Section 3.2 translate into a set of linear
restrictions among these weights, captured by the matrix MJ . Property M guarantees
that the vector of E[c(g(F ), Zi)] across Sperner families F belongs to the column-space of
the matrix MJ , whatever the distribution of Zi. What remains to secure identification is
then simply to tune the covariances for the simple compliance groups, which is achieved
by the construction of h(Zi) in Theorem 1.
The role of Property M in Theorem 1 can be thought of as emerging from there being
under VM more compliance groups in Gc than there are independent pairs of points in
the support of the instruments. By contrast, under IAM with J binary instruments
both are generally equal to 2J − 1, and it is possible to identify the average treatment
effect ∆g′ := E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Gi = g′] within any single such compliance group g′ (and
hence also obtain any desired convex combination of the ∆g′). However, under VM the
corresponding choice c(g, z) = 1(g = g′) fails to satisfy Property M, and we will not be
able to identify the ∆g individually in general.
13 The first requirement in Property M of
12Special cases include two stage least squares: h(z) = E[Di|Zi = z], and Wald estimands: h(z) = 1(Zi=z)P (Zi=z) −
1(Zi=z
′)
P (Zi=z′)
.
13We can see this in a simple example with J = 2 and g = Z1 complier. In this case Property M would require that
c(eager complier, z) = c(Z1 complier, z) + c(Z2 complier, z)− c(reluctant complier, z), i.e. that 0 = 1 + 0− 1, cf Eq. (2).
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zero weight on always-takers or never-takers on the other hand is familiar from analysis
based on IAM.14
4.2 Examples from the family of identified parameters
While Property M introduced in Section 4 itself is somewhat abstract, the following result
shows that it is equivalent to c(g, z) being equal to a linear combination of selection
functions Dg(z).
Proposition 6. A function c : G × Z → {0, 1} satisfies Property M if and only if
c(g, z) =
K∑
k=1
{Dg(uk(z))−Dg(lk(z))}
for some K ≤ J/2, where uk(·) and lk(·) are functions Z → Z such that uk(z) ≥ lk(z)
component-wise while lk(z) ≥ uk+1(z) component-wise, for all k and z ∈ Z.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 6 yields a natural interpretation of average treatment effects that satisfy
Property M, which is that they can be written as
∆c = E
[
Yi(1)− Yi(0)
∣∣∣∣∣
K⋃
k=1
{Di(uk(Zi)) > Di(lk(Zi))}
]
(4)
for some functions uk and lk having the properties stated in Proposition 6.
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Equation 4 we see that the types of complier groups that identified parameters can
condition on are groups of individuals that are responsive to any of a set of K instrument
transitions which each induce only one-way flows into treatment. This feature is in fact
common to both IAM and VM. Indeed under IAM, identified parameters can also be
written in a similar form, as discussed in the proof Proposition 6.
While the form of Equation 4 is somewhat familiar from LATE results under IAM,
the additional structure of VM yields new causal parameters that bear economically
interesting interpretations. The remainder of this section continues to focus on average
treatment effects ∆c, though θ
fd
c parameters can be defined for the analogous groups.
Table 3 presents some leading examples of ∆c that satisfy Property M, as can be seen by
applying Proposition 6. All of the cases presented in Table 3 admit the form of Equation
(4) with a single term (K = 1), given in the third column.
I call the first item in Table 3 the “all compliers LATE” (ACL), which is the average
treatment effect among all units who are not always-takers or never-takers. This is the
largest subgroup of the population for which treatment effects can be generally point
14Note that E[c(g, Zi)] = 0 would also be necessary for any additional groups g for whom, given the distribution of
Zi, there is no actual variation in treatment status. In the baseline analysis, such additional groups will be ruled out by
Assumption 3.
15This expression is obtained by substituting Ci = c(Gi, Zi), and noting that
∑K
k=1Di(uk(Zi))−Di(lk(Zi)) equals one
if and only if Di(uk(Zi)) > Di(lk(Zi)) for some k.
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Parameter c(g, z) Proposition 6 form
ACL 1(g ∈ Gc) Dg(1, 1 . . . 1)−Dg(0, 0 . . . 0)
SLATEJ Dg((1 . . . 1), z−J )−Dg((0 . . . 0), z−J )) ”
SLATTJ Dg(z) · (Dg((1 . . . 1), z−J )−Dg((0 . . . 0), z−J ))) Dg(z)−Dg((0 . . . 0), z−J )
SLATUJ (1−Dg(z)) · (Dg((1 . . . 1), z−J )−Dg((0 . . . 0), z−J ))) Dg((1 . . . 1), z−J )−Dg(z)
PTEj(z
∗
−j) Dg(1, z∗−j)−Dg(0, z∗−j)) ”
Table 3: Leading parameters of interest satisfying Property M, including: the All Compliers LATE, set LATEs,
set LATEs on the treated, set LATEs on the untreated, and partial treatment effects (see text for details).
identified from instrument variation.16 With two instruments, the ACL averages over all
units who are Z1, Z2, eager or reluctant compliers. In the returns to schooling example,
we can equivalently describe the ACL as the average treatment effect among individuals
who would go to college were it close and cheap, but would not were it far and expensive.
On the other end of the spectrum, the final row of Table 3 gives the most disaggregated
type of parameter satisfying Property M, what might be called a partial treatment effect
PTEj(z
∗
−j). This is the average treatment effect among individuals that move into treat-
ment when a single instrument j is shifted from zero to one, while the other instrument
values are held fixed at some explicit vector of values z∗−j. An example is the average
treatment effect among individuals who go to college if it is close and cheap, but not if
it is far and cheap. Ultimately, all ∆c satisfying Property M can be written as convex
combinations of such partial treatment effects though the number could be quite large
(see Supplemental Material for an explicit expression). However, the PTEs still combine
compliance groups: the example above for instance combines proximity compliers with
reluctant compliers.
The remaining parameters in Table 3 constitute a middle ground between the granular
Pt E’s and the very broad averaging of the ACL. For example, the ACL is a special
case of what I call a set local average treatment effect, or SLATEJ , which captures the
average treatment effect among units that move into treatment when all instruments in
some fixed set J are changed from 0 to 1, with the other instruments not in J fixed at
their realized values. The ACL is a special case in which this set is all of the instruments:
J = {1, 2, . . . J}. When J contains just one instrument index, SLATE recovers treatment
effects among those who would “comply” with variation in that single instrument. For
example, SLATE{2} is the average treatment effect among individuals who don’t go to
college if it is far, but do if it is close. This parameter may be of interest to policymakers
considering whether to expand a community college to a new campus, for example. The
group of individuals included in SLATE{2} are Z2 compliers, eager compliers with high
tuition rates (Z1i = 0), and reluctant compliers with low tuition rates (Z1i = 1).
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16We may of course still be able to say something about treatment effects for never-takers and always-takers given
additional restrictions (see e.g. Section 4.3 for bounds on the unconditional ATE when potential outcomes are bounded).
17Note that a single-instrument SLATE like SLATE{2} does not generally correspond to using Z2 alone as an instrument,
since this latter estimand does not control for variation in Z1 that is correlated with Z2. If on the other hand the instruments
are independent of one another, using 2SLS may be justified, as I show in the Supplemental Material.
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For a discrete instrumental variable mapped to multiple binary instruments by Propo-
sition 4, the LATE among units moved into treatment between any two of its values will
also be an example of a SLATE. For example, if Z1 has support z1 < z2 < z3 < z4,
the average treatment effect among individuals for which Di(z4, Z−1,i) > Di(z2, Z−1,i)
corresponds to SLATEJ with J = {Z˜3, Z˜4}. SLATE thus allows the practitioner to
flexibly condition upon compliance with respect to individual or joint variation in the
instruments.
The treatment effect parameters SLATTJ and SLATUJ in the final two rows of Table
3 are similar to SLATEJ but additionally condition on units’ realized treatment status.
For example SLATT{1,2} with our two instruments averages over individuals who do go
to college, but wouldn’t have were it far and expensive.18 SLATT and SLATU can also be
used to construct bounds on the average treatment effect among the treated or untreated,
when potential outcomes are bounded, following logic for the ATE given in Section 4.3.
To construct some further examples of identified parameters from the ones mentioned
in Table 3, one could make use of a closure property of the set of ∆c that satisfy Property
M. Let C denote the set of c : G×Z → {0, 1} that satisfy Property M, and let ca(g, z) and
cb(g, z) be two functions in C. Then it is straightforward to show that ca(g, z)−cb(g, z) ∈ C
if and only if cb(g, z) ≤ ca(g, z) for all z ∈ Z, g ∈ Gc.19 We can use this observation to
generate parameters that condition on the “complement” of the complier group for ∆cb
within the larger complier group for ∆ca . For example, with J = 2:
E[∆i|Gi ∈ Gc − {Di(1, Z2i)−Di(0, Z2i)}]
yields the average treatment effect among individuals who are counted in the ACL but
not in SLATE{1}. These individuals would not respond to a counterfactual reduction in
college tuition alone, but would respond if both instruments were shifted in concert.
4.3 Further results on identification
This section outlines some further results related to identification under VM. I begin with
several observations that strengthen or extend the reach of Theorem 1.
Consequences and extensions of Theorem 1
1) The size of the relevant complier sub-population is identified: The argument used in
Theorem 1 can be leveraged to show that the proportion of relevant “compliers” associated
with any causal parameter satisfying Property M is also identified, and is the denominator
of the associated estimand:
18Note that with a single binary instrument, SLATT{1} coincides with ACL = SLATE{1}, as E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Di =
1, Gi = complier] = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Zi = 1, complier] = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|complier], using Assumption 1. However, when
the group Gc consists of more than one group, the “all-compliers” version of SLATT generally differs from ACL.
19This follows from linearity and the definition of Property M, while cb(g, z) ≤ ca(g, z) is necessary for the image of the
new function to remain {0, 1}.
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Corollary 2 to Theorem 1. Make Assumptions 1-3. For any c that satisfies Property
M, P (Ci = 1) is identified as E[h(Zi)Di], where h(z) is as given in Theorem 1.
Proof. See Appendix D.
2) Property M as a necessary condition. Property M was introduced in this section as
part of a set of sufficient conditions for identification of ∆c. One can show that, loosely
speaking, any identified ∆c must satisfy Property M. In this sense, Property M is also a
necessary condition for identification. The simplest form of this result I express in terms
of so-called “IV-like estimands” introduced by Mogstad et al. (2018), which are any cross
moment E[s(Di, Zi)Yi] between Yi and a function of treatment and instruments. Let PDZ
denote the joint distribution of D and Z, which is identified. Then:
Proposition 7. Suppose ∆c is identified by a finite set of IV-like estimands and PDZ,
provided that Assumptions 1-3 hold and P (Ci = 1) > 0. Then ∆c satisfies Property M.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The result can be strengthened given regularity conditions on the support of potential
outcomes:
Proposition 8. Suppose that the support of each potential outcome conditional on Gi = g
is independent of all g ∈ Gc for which P (Gi = g) > 0, and that the density (or p.m.f.)
of each Yi(d) is uniformly bounded and separated from zero over that support, conditional
on each such Gi = g. Then if ∆c is point identified from the distribution of (Yi, Di, Zi)
whenever Assumptions 1-3 hold and P (Ci = 1) > 0, ∆c must satisfy Property M.
Proof. See Supplemental Material.
3) PM alone does not lead to identification. We can demonstrate that the assumption of
vector monotonicity does have identifying power in Theorem 1, above and beyond that
of partial monotonicity. For the J = 2 case, it is possible to see by explicit enumeration
of the possible compliance groups that Theorem 1 cannot hold under PM only:
Proposition 9. When J = 2, if PM holds but neither VM nor IAM hold, the ACL is
not point identified from knowledge of any set of IV-like estimands and PDZ.
Proof. See Appendix D.
4) Linear dependency among the instruments: Assumption 3 is stronger than is strictly
necessary for identification, since linear dependencies between products of the instru-
ments may not pose a problem if the corresponding “weights” in ∆c do not need be
tuned independently from one another. In Appendix A, I give a version of Assump-
tion 3 and generalization of the identification theorem that can accommodate instrument
support restrictions and/or non-rectangular Z (for instance after applying Proposition 4).
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5) Conditional distributions of the potential outcomes By choosing f(Y ) = 1(Y ≤ y) in
Theorem 1 for some value y in the support of Yi, we can identify the CDF of each potential
outcome at y conditional on Ci = 1 as: FY (d)|C=1(y) = (−1)d+1E[h(Zi)1(Di=d)1(Yi≤y)]E[h(Zi)Di] (note
that unlike identification of ∆c this requires observing (Yi, Zi, Di) all in the same sample).
This allows for the identification of Ci = 1 conditional quantile treatment effects, bounds
on the distribution of treatment effects (Fan and Park, 2010), or distributional treatment
effects: FY (1)|C=1(y)− FY (0)|C=1(y) as E[h(Zi)1(Yi≤y)]E[h(Zi)Di] .
6) Covariates. If Assumption 1 holds only conditional on a set of covariates X, and
Assumption 3 also holds conditionally, then Theorem 1 can be taken to hold within a
covariate cell Xi = x. In Appendix B, I describe how covariates can be accommodated
nonparametrically, or parametrically as implemented in Section 6.
Identification of the ACL from a single Wald ratio
The population estimand corresponding to the all compliers LATE takes on a particularly
simple form. In particular, the ACL is equal to the following single Wald ratio:
ρZ¯,z :=
E[Yi|Zi = Z¯]− E[Yi|Zi = Z]
E[Di|Zi = Z¯]− E[Di|Zi = Z] (5)
where Z¯ = (1, 1, . . . 1)′ and Z = (0, 0, . . . 0)′, provided that P (Zi = Z¯) > 0 and P (Zi =
Z) > 0, and the denominator is non-zero.20 This can be seen by applying the law of
iterated expectations over compliance groups, or using Theorem 1. That ρZ¯,z is equivalent
to the expression given for ACL by Theorem 1 is not obvious, but this can be shown by
applying Corollary 1 and using properties of the matrix A.
Thus the ACL is identified by a remarkably simple quantity: one can restrict the
population to Zi ∈ {Z, Z¯} and use 1(Zi = Z¯) as a single instrument. However, Theorem
1 yields identification of a much larger class of parameters than ACL alone, which are
not generally equal to a single Wald ratio. Furthermore, as we will see in Section 5, the
alternative form of Theorem 1 suggests a means of improving estimation of the ACL. In
particular, when the number of sample observations in Z and Z¯ is not large, the Wald
ratio ρZ¯,Z may be difficult to estimate precisely, and the sample analog of Eq. (5) can be
expected to perform poorly. A regularization procedure based on the expression for ∆c
from Theorem 1 can be helpful in such cases, as shown in Appendix C.
Identified sets for ATE, ATT, and ATU
One drawback of the identification results presented is that since parameters like ∆c
satisfying Property M exclude never-takers and always-takers by assumption, their defi-
nition always depends upon the set of instruments available. This is not ideal unless the
complier subpopulation is directly of interest.
20 An analogous result holds under IAM as well with finite instruments, where in that case we take any Z¯ ∈
argmaxzE[Di|Zi = z] and Z ∈ argminzE[Di|Zi = z], and define Gc := {g ∈ G : E[Dg(Zi)] ∈ (0, 1)}.
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When Yi has bounded support, the parameters identified by Theorem 1 can be used
to generate sharp worst-case bounds in the spirit of Manski (1990) for the unconditional
average treatment effect (ATE), average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and av-
erage treatment effect on the untreated (ATU). Here I show this for the ATE to illustrate
– identified sets for the ATT and ATU can be constructed by analogous steps. Suppose
that Yi(d) ∈ [Y, Y¯ ] with probability one, for each d ∈ {0, 1}. Then bounds for the ATE
can be constructed by noting that:
1. ATE := E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)] = pa∆a + pn∆n + (1− pt − pa)ACL
2. pn∆n ∈
[
Y · pn − E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = Z¯], Y¯ · pn − E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = Z¯]
]
3. pa∆a ∈
[
E[YiDi|Zi = Z]− pa · Y¯ , E[YiDi|Zi = Z]− pa · Y
]
where pa := P (Gi = a.t.) = E[Di|Zi = Z] and pn := P (Gi = n.t.) = E[1−Di|Zi = Z¯].
Note that under the bounded support condition the ATE can be partially identified
whenever its conditional analog is identified for some subgroup of the population, and
the size of that subgroup is also identified. Using variation in all of the instruments, as
the ACL does, for the conditioning event leads to the narrowest possible such bounds.
5 Estimation
This section proposes a natural two-step estimator for the family of identified causal
parameters introduced in Section 4, focusing on the conditional average treatment effects
∆c. Theorem 1 establishes that ∆c satisfying Property M are equal to a ratio of two
population expectations – thus a natural plug-in estimator simply replaces these with
their sample counterparts, provided h(Zi) is a strong enough instrument to avoid any
weak identification issues.
Following h(Zi) = λ
′Σ−1(Γi − E[Γi]) from Theorem 1, define Hˆ = nΓ˜(Γ˜′Γ˜)−1λˆ, where
Γ˜ is a n×k design matrix with entries Γ˜il = ZSli− 1n
∑n
j=1 ZSlj, where Sl is the l
th subset
according to some arbitrary ordering of the k := 2J − 1 non-empty subsets S ⊆ {1 . . . J}.
Note that the rows of Γ˜ correspond to observations of the vector Γi introduced in Section
4.1, de-meaned with respect to the sample mean. The vector λˆ is a sample estimator of
λ = (E[c(g(S1), Zi)], . . . E[c(g(Sk), Zi)])
′, given explicitly below for our leading examples.
Given the vector Hˆ as defined above, consider ρˆ = (Hˆ ′D)−1(Hˆ ′Y ), where Y and D
are n× 1 vectors of observations of Yi and Di, respectively. Noticing that for any vector
V ∈ Rn, (Γ˜′Γ˜)−1Γ˜′V is the sample linear projection coefficient vector of V on the de-
meaned sample vectors of ZSi, we can re-express it by the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
as (0, λ′)(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′V , where Γ adds a column of ones and skips the demeaning. The
estimator can now be written as ρˆ = ρˆ(λˆ) where
ρˆ(λ) =
(
(0, λ′)(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′D
)−1
(0, λ′)(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y (6)
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Assume existence of (Γ′Γ)−1 in finite sample, and note that its population analog exists
as a consequence of Assumption 3. When Assumption 3 does not hold but identification
is still possible (see Appendix A), the matrices Γ˜ and Γ may be defined in the same
way but using only sets S within a smaller collection F . For example, when using
construction of Proposition 4 that maps discrete to binary instruments, F can be taken
to include all sets of the final binary instruments that do not contain distinct Z˜ from
the same original discrete instrument. In all cases, let F index the elements of Γi, where
F = {S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . J}, S 6= ∅} in the baseline setting.
Comparison with 2SLS: Note that the estimator ρˆ(λ) in Equation 6 is very similar in form
to a “fully-saturated” 2SLS estimator that includes an indicator for each value of Zi ∈ Z
in the first stage. Indeed, that estimator is ρˆ2sls = (D
′Γ(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′D)−1D′Γ(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y .21
The key difference is that rather than aggregating over linear projection coefficients
(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′V for V ∈ {D, Y } using the weights D′Γ (which are governed asymptotically by
the statistical distribution of Di and Zi), ρˆ(λ) uses weights (0, λ
′), chosen to match the
desired parameter of interest. Relative to 2SLS, ρˆ(λ) can be thought of as sacrificing some
statistical efficiency in order to guarantee that it recovers a well-defined causal parameter
under VM. In Section C.1 I discuss regaining some of that lost efficiency through regular-
ization, which is borne out in the simulation in Appendix C. It bears emphasizing that
with a large number of instruments, ρˆ is no more “expensive” than 2SLS, both involve
computing a pair of linear projections with the same number of terms. This is despite
the fact that the richness of possible selection behavior is more more complex under VM
than under IAM, scaling as DedJ rather than 2
J .
Under regularity conditions (see Theorem 2 in Appendix C), we will have that for any
λˆ
p→ λ ∈ R|F|:
ρˆ(λˆ)
p→
∑
g∈Gc
P (Gi = g)[MJλ]g∑
g′∈Gc P (Gi = g
′)[MJλ]g′
·∆g
Matching the RHS of the above to particular estimands ∆c that satisfy Property M
is achieved by choosing λˆ. Table 4 gives natural sample estimators for ACL, SLATE,
SLATT, SLATU and PTE that are consistent. Note that in the case of the ACL λˆ does
not depend on the data and thus no “first-step” is necessary in estimation.
Regularization: Consider the ACL, and recall from Section 4.3 that it is equal to a single
Wald ratio. A natural alternative Wald estimator of the ACL is thus:
ρˆZ¯,Z :=
Eˆ[Yi|Zi = Z¯]− Eˆ[Yi|Zi = z]
Eˆ[Di|Zi = Z¯]− Eˆ[Di|Zi = z]
(7)
where recall that under Assumption 3 Z¯ = (111 . . . 1)′ or Z = (000 . . . 0)′. It turns out
that ρˆZ¯,Z and ρˆ((1, 1, . . . 1)
′) in Equation 6 are in fact numerically equivalent in finite
21The proof of Corollary 1 gives the basis transformation from a design matrix of indicators to Γ, which cancels in ρˆ2sls.
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Parameter Estimator λˆ of population λ
ACL (1, 1, . . . 1)′
SLATEJ λˆS = 1(J ∩ S 6= ∅)Pˆ (ZS−J ,i = 1)
SLATTJ λˆS = 1(J ∩ S 6= ∅)Pˆ (ZS,i = 1)
SLATUJ λˆS = 1(J ∩ S 6= ∅)Pˆ (ZS−J ,i(1− ZJ ,i) = 1)
PTEj(z
∗
−j) λˆS = 1(z
∗
−j,1 ∪ j = S)
Table 4: Estimators λˆ for the leading parameters of interest. S−J denotes the set difference {j : j ∈ S, j /∈ J }
and z∗−j,1 denotes the set of instruments that are equal to one in z
∗
−j .
sample.22 In situations where there is non-zero but small support on the points Z¯ and
Z, we may thus expect that ρˆ((1, 1, . . . 1)′) may perform quite poorly as an estimator of
ACL in small samples, since it effectively ignores all of the data for which Zi /∈ {Z, Z¯}.
This issue is mentioned by Fro¨lich (2007) in the context of IAM, in which case ρˆZ¯,Z is
also consistent for the ACL with finite Z (see footnote 20). Appendix C develops and
investigates the performance of a data-driven regularization procedure to ameliorate this
problem, while also showing asymptotic normality of the estimator with or without such
regularization. Appendix C also reports a simulation study that shows the regularization
procedure can indeed be helpful in practice.
6 Revisiting the returns to college
In this section I apply the results to study the labor market returns to college. In the past,
this literature has based IV methods on either an assumption of homogeneous treatment
effects, or the traditional IAM notion of monotonicity. Using the methods developed
in this paper valid under VM, I find evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects across
compliance groups, although statistical precision is an issue due to the small sample. This
complements existing results that find evidence of heterogeneity, but are based upon IAM
– a less plausible assumption in this context. For different choice of the instruments than
I use, MTW present a test of IAM in this empirical setting and find evidence that it does
not hold. In the Supplemental Material, I also present a second empirical application of
my methods to the effects of children on labor supply.
6.1 Sample and implementation details
I use the dataset from Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) (henceforth CHV) con-
structed from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The sample consists of
1,747 white males in the U.S., first interviewed in 1979 at ages that ranged from 14 to
22, and then again annually. The outcome of interest Yi is the log of individual i’s wage
22To see this, note that the vector H of Hi solves the system of equations Γ
′Hi = (1 . . . 1)′. Among vectors that are
in the column space of Γ, H is the unique such solution, given that the design matrix Γ has full column rank. One can
readily verify that Γ′H = (1, 1, . . . 1) with the choice Hi =
1(Zi=(1...1))
Pˆ (Zi=(0...0))
− 1(Zi=(0...0))
Pˆ (Zi=(0...0))
, and that this H = Γη with
η = (1/Pˆ (Zi = (1 . . . 1)), 0, . . . 0,−1/Pˆ (Zi = (0 . . . 0))).
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in 1991, and treatment Di = 1 indicates i attended at least some college. As in CHV,
treatment effects are expressed in roughly per-year equivalents by dividing by four.
CHV consider four separate instruments for schooling. In a baseline setup, I use the
two binary instruments from our running example: tuition and proximity. A second setup
then adds the remaining two instruments, which capture local labor market conditions
when a student is in high school. The first two instruments are defined as follows: Z2i = 1
indicates the presence of a public college in i’s county of residence at age 14, while Z1i = 1
indicates that average tuition rates local to i’s residence around age 17 falls below the
sample median, which corresponds to about $2,170 in 1993 dollars. This represents
one particular choice of how the underlying continuous instrument from CHV can be
discretized into a binary variable, but note that the methods in this paper could also
be used with tuition recast as a discrete variable with a rich set of tuition levels. The
Supplemental Material reports the distribution of the underlying tuition variable, whose
definition is described further in CHV.
While VM is a natural assumption for the tuition and proximity instruments, a con-
ditional version of instrument validity is more plausible than Assumption 1. Following
CHV, I assume:
{(Yi(1), Yi(0), Gi) ⊥ Zi} |Xi (8)
where Xi is a vector of observed covariates unaffected by treatment. Conditioning on Xi
can help control for unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with location during
teenage years. Appendix B considers extensions of the basic identification and estimation
results to include such covariates. The main result of the Appendix is that while condi-
tional average treatment effects ∆c(x) := E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|Ci = c,Xi = x] can be identified
for each x in the support of Xi, the unconditional ∆c turns out to be simpler to estimate,
particularly when the two conditional expectation functions E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] and
E[Di|Zi = z,Xi = x] are additively separable between z and x. In this case, the only
change required to the estimator presented in Section 5 is to “control” semiparametrically
for Xi in the linear projections of Yi and Di onto the instruments. In particular, when
E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] = y(z) + w(x) and E[Di|Zi = z,Xi = x] = d(z) + v(x)
for some functions y, w, d and v, then a causal parameter ∆c can be estimated as:
∆ˆc =
∑
z∈Z
(∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅ λˆSAS,z
)
yˆ(z)∑
z∈Z
(∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅ λˆSAS,z
)
dˆ(z)
(9)
where the matrix A is defined in Corollary 1 to Theorem 1, the estimators λˆS are as given
in Section 5, and yˆ(z) and dˆ(z) are consistent estimators of the functions y(z) and d(z).
Note that as the vector Γi contains a full set of interactions between the binary instru-
ments, both y(z) and d(z) are automatically linear in Γi. If the functions w(x) and v(x)
are taken to also be linear in x, Equation 9 can be reduced to a simple generalization of the
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estimator from Section 5: ∆ˆc =
(
(0, λˆ′)(Γ′MXΓ)−1Γ′MXD
)−1
(0, λˆ′)(Γ′MXΓ)−1Γ′MXY
where MX is a projection onto the orthogonal complement of the design matrix of Xi.
I follow this strategy, computing standard errors by applying the delta method to the
system of regression equations (one each for Di and Yi, along with a regression on a
constant for each component of λˆ), allowing for heteroscedasticity and cross-correlation
between the equations.23
I follow CHV and as control variables a student’s corrected Armed Forces Qualification
Test score, mother’s years of education, number of siblings, “permanent” local earnings in
county of residence at 17, mother’s years of education, number of siblings, “permanent”
unemployment in county of residence at 17, earnings in county of residence in 1991, and
unemployment in state of residence in 1991, along with an indicator for urban residence at
17, and cohort dummies. The definition and construction of these variables is described
in CHV. Also following CHV, squares of the continuous control variables are included
in Xi, relaxing the assumption of strict linearity in each. The above variables represent
the union of variables that CHV use in their first stage and outcome equation, with one
exception: I drop years of experience in 1991 since it may itself be affected by schooling,
as MTW do as well in their empirical application. In the two instrument setup, I also
add to Xi the two “unused” instruments from CHV and their squares: long-run local
earnings in county of residence at 17 and long run permanent unemployment in state of
residence at 17.
6.2 Results from baseline setup with two instruments
The left panel of Table 5 reports a cross tabulation of the two instruments. As noted,
the observations are relatively evenly distributed across the four cells. The instruments
are positively correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of about 0.13.
Distribution of the instruments
Z2=“close”
Z1=“cheap”
0 1
0 469 401
1 361 516
Mean fitted propensity scores
Z2
Z1
far close
expensive 0.451 0.509
cheap 0.487 0.530
Table 5: Left: number of observations having each pair of values of the instruments, with total sample size
N = 1, 747. Right: fitted propensity scores estimated by linear regression, evaluated at the sample mean of the
Xi variables.
The right panel of Table 5 reports the conditional propensity score function E[Di|Zi =
z,Xi = x] estimated as described above and averaged over the empirical distribution of Xi
23Note that while Appendix C Theorem 2 provides a variance expression for ρˆλˆ, this does not cover the case with
covariates, so I do not implement an estimator based upon it here. Also, as the distribution of Zi is fairly well balanced
across the four cells of Z, I do not implement the regularization procedure proposed in Appendix C.
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(in practice, evaluated at the mean of Xi). This allows us to take the (expensive, far) cell
45.1% as an estimate of the overall proportion of never-takers in the population, while the
share of never-takers is estimated to be 47.0%. The remaining roughly 8% of the popula-
tion are generalized “compliers” consisting of the tuition (Z1), proximity (Z2), eager and
reluctant compliers. From the table we can also see that P (Di(expensive, close, x) >
Di(expensive, far, x)) ≈ 5.7%, and P (Di(cheap, far, x) > Di(expensive, far, x)) ≈
3.6%. Combining these figures and the compliance group definitions from Section 3,
we see that between 1.5% and 3.6% of the population are eager compliers, while no more
than 2.1% are reluctant compliers. Similarly, no more than 3.6% are tuition compliers,
and between 2.1% and 5.7% are proximity compliers. Overall, the data are compatible
with a roughly even split between the four groups, but it is also possible that proximity
compliers account for more than half of all generalized compliers.
We now turn to treatment effect estimates. Figure 2 reports estimates of several of
Figure 2: Estimates of various causal parameters identified under VM with two instruments, alongside fully-
saturated 2SLS for comparison. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, and “Group Size” refers to the identified
quantity P (Ci = 1) for each parameter
the parameters introduced in Section 4, alongside fully-saturated 2SLS for comparison.
Consider first the All Compliers LATE (ACL): the point estimate of 0.14 indicates that
having attended a year of college increases 1991 wages of all compliers by roughly 14%
on average. This estimate is within the range of roughly −0.1 to 0.3 of the marginal
treatment effect (MTE) function estimated by CHV under the assumption of IAM, and is
similar to their point estimate of the average treatment on the treated under a parametric
normal selection model. The 2SLS estimate from Figure 2 yields a similar value at 0.12.
Note that given the limited sample size none of the estimates are quite significant at even
the 90% level. I thus focus discussion on the point estimates for the sake of illustration
with this important caveat.
The point estimates from the remaining rows in Figure 2 suggest that the ACL aggre-
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gates over substantial heterogeneity in the population. For example, the tuition SLATE
suggests that a year of college has no average effect on the wages of individuals who move
into treatment if and only if a college is nearby, given local affordability. Recall that
this group includes proximity compliers, eager compliers for whom college is expensive,
and reluctant compliers for whom it is cheap. On the other hand, the SLATE for tuition
is about three times as large as the ACL. These results are suggestive that the average
treatment effect among tuition compliers is larger than it is among proximity compliers,
however the sign of the difference is not identified.24 Note finally that the point estimates
for SLATU and SLATT suggest that among the compliers averaged over by the ACL,
those who in fact go to college have greater treatment effects on average than those who
do not, which is consistent with some students selecting on the basis of their future gains.
6.3 Results with all four instruments
I now add the additional two instruments from CHV, to increase comparability and
emphasize the scalability of the proposed methods to multiple instruments.
Accordingly, we let Z3i indicate that local earnings in i’s county of residence at 17 is
below the sample median, and Z4i indicates that unemployment in i’s state of residence
at 17 is above the sample 25% percentile. This threshold is chosen as it yields a stronger
first stage as compared with the median. The two local labor market variables and their
squares are removed from the vector of controls Xi. Vector monotonicity implies that
the propensity score is component-wise monotonic in the four instruments, implying 32
linear inequalities among first stage coefficients. Although not reported here, t-statistics
are positive for all but six of these hypotheses, and none is rejected at the 10% level.
Table 3 shows that the ACL is not appreciably changed from the case with only two
instruments, and we again have that the tuition SLATE is much larger and the proximity
SLATE close to zero. The SLATE for low local wages occupies an intermediate value,
while the SLATE for high unemployment is estimated to be negative (suggesting that
more schooling reduces wages), but with a much larger standard error. The unemploy-
ment SLATE is so imprecisely estimated in part because its corresponding complier group
is the smallest of the estimands considered: with just 2% of the population.
To compare these results more directly with CHV, recall that the marginal treatment
effect function (e.g. Heckman and Vytlacil 2005) is defined as
MTE(u, x) := E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Ui = u,Xi = x]
where Ui is a uniformly distributed heterogeneity parameter that can be thought of
as a proclivity against treatment in the selection model Di(z, x) = 1(P (z, x) ≥ Ui),
with P (z, x) := E[Di|Zi = z,Xi = x] the propensity score function. CHV estimate
the MTE function evaluated at the mean of x to decrease monotonically with u over
24In the Supplemental Material I show in the J = 2 case that if ∆g and corresponding group size pg is known for one
group g ∈ Gc ex- ante, then the remaining three group specific treatment effects and group sizes can be identified.
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Figure 3: Estimates of various causal parameters identified under VM with all four instruments, alongside
fully-saturated 2SLS for comparison. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, and “Group Size” refers to the
identified quantity P (Ci = 1) for each parameter.
the unit interval. For each instrument Zj, call i a “j-responder” if Di(1, Z−j,i, Xi) >
Di(0, Z−j,i, Xi). In the context of a model in which both IAM and VM hold, the estimates
in Figure 3 coupled with CHV would thus suggest that tuition responders tend to have
the lowest unobserved costs Ui, followed by wage responders, then proximity responders,
and then unemployment responders. However, while IAM effectively “flattens” variation
in any of the instruments into variation in the scalar parameter P (Zi, Xi), VM allows
flows into treatment to depend in an essential way on which instrument is manipulated
when IAM fails. The estimands in Figure 3 are directly relevant to hypothetical policies
which vary that instrument alone.
The results in Figure 3 can also be compared with estimates reported by Mogstad
et al. (2020b) that are calculated by 2SLS. While their empirical application focuses
on the interpretation of 2SLS under PM or VM, we have seen that in this particular
setting 2SLS tends to yield numerical estimates that are close to the ACL. Similarly,
the SLATEs for the proximity and low local wage instruments in Figure 3 align roughly
with 2SLS specifications in MTW in which a single instrument is excluded in the second
stage. However this similarity will not hold in all contexts, underlying the importance of
methods such as those presented in this paper or in Mogstad et al. (2020a). Appendix
C provides simulates a data generating process for example in which 2SLS lies outside of
the convex hull of treatment effects in the population.
Finally, observe that in this four instrument setup, there are in principle 167 under-
lying compliance groups aside from always- and never-takers, and that together these
comprise 17.4% of the population (cf. 7.8% for the four such groups with two instru-
ments). Nevertheless, computing the treatment effect estimates involves regressions with
at most 16 terms in addition to the controls, keeping implementation manageable. Note
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that while the standard errors for the 2SLS estimate are only slightly smaller than for the
ACL, this is sufficient for significance at the 95% level even in this small sample. This
in part reflects the fact 2SLS weighs across the groups to minimize variance rather than
pin down a specific target parameter.
7 Conclusion
In both observational and experimental settings, it is natural to expect individuals to
vary both in their treatment effects and in how they select into treatment. This latter
type of heterogeneity is likely to be particularly pronounced when a researcher is using
multiple instrumental variables for a single binary treatment. This paper has shown that
causal inference with heterogeneous treatment effects is possible in such settings under
a simple restriction on selection that is often motivated by economic theory: what I call
vector monotonicity.
In particular, I have defined and characterized a class of interpretable causal param-
eters that can be point identified under vector monotonicity with discrete instruments,
and proposed an estimator that is similar in construction to the familiar method of two
stage least squares (2SLS). While the convenience of implementing the two estimators
scales similarly with the number of instruments, 2SLS is not guaranteed to recover an in-
terpretable causal parameter under vector monotonicity (though it may in special cases).
By contrast, the estimator I propose is always targets a particular well-defined causal
parameter. In an application to the labor market returns to college education, I find that
estimates based on vector monotonicity suggest that underlying groups in the population
that exhibit different selection behavior also have highly heterogeneous treatment effects.
A natural extension of this paper is to generalize the concept of vector monotonicity
and identification results to cases in which treatment can take on more than two values,
which I leave for future work.
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Appendices
A Identification result without rectangular support
This section provides an extension of Theorem 1 for cases when the support Z of the
instruments is not rectangular (i.e. supp(Zi) 6= (Z1 ×Z2 × · · · × ZJ)), and there may be
perfect linear dependencies between the instruments (of the form that would arise from
the mapping from discrete to binary instruments presented in Section 3.3).
A weaker version of Assumption 3 is comprised of the following two conditions, with
the definition that Z∅i is a degenerate random variable that takes the value of one with
probability one:
Assumption 3a* (existence of instruments). There exists a family F of subsets of
the instruments S ⊆ {1 . . . J}, where ∅ ∈ F and |F| > 1, such that random variables
ZSi for all S ∈ F are linearly independent, i.e. P
(∑
S∈F ωSZSi = 0
)
< 1 for all vectors
ω ∈ R|F|/0.
Assumption 3b* (non-degenerate subsets generate the compliance groups).
There exists a family F satisfying Assumption 3a*, such that for any S /∈ F , g(F ) /∈ G
for all Sperner families that F that contain S.
Assumption 3a* is in itself very weak, requiring only that there exists some product of
the instruments that has strictly positive variance. Assumption 3b* is much more restric-
tive: it says that all compliance groups aside from never-takers can be generated from
members of a family of linearly independent subsets of the instruments.
The construction in Proposition 4 mapping discrete instruments to binary instruments
yields a case where Assumption 3* will hold, given rectangular support of the original
discrete instruments.
Proposition. Let each Zj have Mj ordered points of support z
j
1 < z
j
2 · · · < zjMj and let
Z˜jm = 1(Zji ≥ zjm). If P (Zi = z) > 0 for z ∈ (Z1 × Z2 × · · · × ZJ), then Assumption 3*
holds with F the family of all subsets of M := {Z˜jm} j∈{1...J}
m=2...mj
containing at most one Zjm
for any given j ∈ {1 . . . J}.
Proof. See Appendix D.
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The above proposition allows us to make use of Assumption 3* in cases where discrete
instruments are mapped to binary instruments via Proposition 4. To illustrate, consider a
case with a single discrete instrument Z1 having three levels z1 < z2 < z3 and instruments
2 − J binary. Proposition 4 shows that if Z1 . . . ZJ satisfies VM then so does the set of
J + 1 instruments Z˜2, Z˜3, Z2, . . . ZJ where Z˜2 = 1(Z1 ≥ z2) and Z˜3 = 1(Z1 ≥ z3). In this
case there are 2J−1 “redundant” simple compliance groups vis-a-vis Assumption 3, since
for any S ⊆ {2 . . . J}: Z˜2iZ˜3iZSi = Z˜3iZSi.
In this example, the vector Γi would contain all non-null subsets of {Z˜2, Z˜3, Z2, . . . ZJ}
that do not contain both of Z˜2 and Z˜3. In general, F can be constructed by considering
all subsets of the instruments, and for each subset considering all possible assignments
of a value to each instrument, with one fixed value for each instrument omitted from
consideration throughout. Provided rectangular support on the original instruments,
Assumption 3* then follows with this choice of F , for which a generalized version of
Theorem 1 can be stated:
Theorem 1*. The results of Theorem 1 holds under Assumption 3* replacing Assump-
tion 3, where now Γi := {ZSi}S∈F ,S 6=∅, λ := {E[c(S), Zi)]}S∈F ,S 6=∅ and again h(Zi) =
λ′Σ−1(Γi − E[Γi]) with Σ := V ar(Γi), for any family F satisfying Assumption 3*.
Proof. Identical to that of Theorem 1, except as noted therein.
Theorem 1* may also be useful in other cases in which the practitioner has auxiliary
knowledge that some of the compliance groups are not present in the population. In such
cases, Assumption 3* may hold even without rectangular support among the instruments.
B Identification with covariates
This section discusses how one can accommodate, in a nonparametric way, covariates
that need to be conditioned on for the instruments to be valid. In practice, it is often
easier to justify a conditional version of Assumption 1:
{(Yi(1), Yi(0), Gi) ⊥ Zi} |Xi
where X are a set of observed covariates unaffected by treatment. In this section I discuss
identification and considerations for estimation in such a setting. I maintain that vector
monotonicity continues to hold for a set of binary instruments, as VM is expressed in
Assumption 2. This implies that the direction of “compliance” is the same regardless of
Xi, since the condition in Assumption 2 holds with probability one.
If Assumption 3 and Property M each hold conditional on Xi = x, then Theorem 1
implies that we can identify ∆c(x) := E[∆i|Ci = 1, Xi = x] for ∆c satisfying Property
M, from the distribution of (Yi, Zi, Di)|Xi = x. In particular, the function h(z) from
Theorem 1 will now depend on the conditioning value of Xi:
h(Zi, x) = λ(x)
′V ar(Γi|Xi = x)−1 (Γi − E[Γi|Xi = x])
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for each x ∈ X, where recall that Γi is a vector of products ΓSi of Zji within subsets of the
instruments, where S indexes such subsets. Here we define λ(x)S = E[c(g(S), Zi)|Xi = x]
– which is identified – for each simple compliance group g(S). Under these assumptions,
we have that ∆c(x) = E[h(Zi, x)Yi|Xi = x]/E[h(Zi, x)Di|Xi = x].
If the support of Xi corresponds to a small number of “covariate-cells”, it might be
feasible to repeat the entire estimation on fixed-covariate subsamples, to estimate ∆c(x)
for each x ∈ X. If the number of groups is large, or if Xi includes continuous variables,
estimation of ∆c(x) could still in principle be implemented by nonparametric regression
of each component of Γi on Xi as well as nonparametrically estimating the conditional
variance-covariance matrix V ar(Γi|Xi = x) (Yin et al. (2010) describe a kernel-based
method for this). The vector λ(x) can also be computed via nonparametric regression.
Furthermore, when the object of interest is simply the unconditional version of ∆c,
the conditional quantities become nuisance parameters. Notably, they can be integrated
over separately in the numerator and the denominator of the empirical estimand. To see
that this, write:
∆c = E[∆i|Ci = 1] =
∫
dFX|C(x|1)∆c(x)
=
∫
dFX|C(x|1)E[h(Zi, x)Yi|Xi = x]
E[h(Zi, x)Yi|Xi = x] =
∫
dFX|C(x|1)E[h(Zi, x)Yi|Xi = x]
P (Ci = 1|Xi = x)
=
1
P (Ci = 1)
∫
dFX(x)E[h(Zi, Xi)Yi|Xi = x] = E[h(Zi, Xi)Yi]
E[h(Zi, Xi)Di]
where we have used Bayes’ rule and that P (Ci = 1|Xi = x) = E[h(Zi, x)Di|Xi = x] (and
hence P (Ci = 1) = E[h(Zi, Xi)Di] as well). This provides a VM analog to a similar result
that holds under IAM. In that context, Fro¨lich (2007) shows that this fact can deliver√
n-consistency of a nonparametric analog of the Wald ratio.
Note that by the conditional version of Corollary 1 we have that:
∆c =
E[λ˜(Xi)
′A {E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi]}]
E[λ˜(Xi)′A {E[Di|Zi = z,Xi]}]
if we define λ˜(x) to have component λ(x) for any S ⊆ {1 . . . J} , S 6= ∅ and 0 for S = ∅, and
we let {·} indicate vector representations of functions over z ∈ Z. If the CEFs of Y and
D happen to both be separable between Z and X, i.e E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] = y(z) +w(x)
and E[Di|Zi = z,Xi = x] = d(z) + v(x), then the expression simplifies:
∆c =
E[λ˜(Xi)
′A {y(z)}+ w(Xi)λ˜(Xi)′A1]
E[λ˜(Xi)′A {d(z)}+ v(Xi)λ˜(Xi)′A1]
=
E[λ˜(Xi)
′A {y(z)}]
E[λ˜(Xi)′A {d(z)}]
where 1 is a vector of ones and we have used that λ˜(x)′A1 = 0 for any x. This follows from
the definition of the entries: AS,z =
∑
f⊆z0
(z1∪f)=S
(−1)|f | where z0 is the set of components
of z that are equal to zero. For any S 6= ∅,the identity ∑f⊆S(−1)|f | = 0 implies that
[A1]S =
∑
z1⊆S
∑
f⊆(S−z1)(−1)|f | = 0. The first component of A1, corresponding to S =
∅, does not contribute since the first component of λ˜(x) is always zero, by construction.
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Now, since each λS(x) is defined as E[Ci = 1|Gi = g(S), Xi = x], its expectation
delivers the unconditional analog: λS := E[Ci = 1|Gi = g(S)] = E[λ(Xi)S]. Thus we can
write ∆c =
λ′A{y(z)}
λ′A{d(z)} . This shows that in this separable case the estimand that identifies
∆c is essentially unchanged from the baseline case without covariates, aside from the need
to control semiparametrically for Xi to obtain the functions y(z) and d(z). The estimates
reported in Section 6 use this result, with w(x) and v(x) taken to each be linear.
C Regularization and asymptotic distribution
In this section I propose a regularization procedure for the estimator, to improve its
performance in small samples. I then show asymptotically normality of the regularized
estimator and give an expression for the variance, based on a result from Imbens and
Angrist, 1994.
C.1 Regularization of the estimator
Recall from Section 5 that the simple plug-in estimator of the All Compliers LATE in fact
only uses data at two points in Z. This issue can be seen as a near collinearity problem:
when there are few observations in the points Z¯ and Z, the n× |F| design matrix Γ will
have singular values that are close to zero (to see this, note that Γ′Γ = A′−1n·diag{Pˆ (Zi =
z)}A−1). This observation suggests that the issue might be mitigated by employing a
ridge-type shrinkage estimator (see e.g. Hoerl and Kennard, 1970). Accordingly, we allow
a sequence of regularization parameters αn:
ρˆ(λˆ, α) =
(
(0, λˆ′)(Γ′Γ + αI)−1Γ′D
)−1
(0, λˆ′)(Γ′Γ + αI)−1Γ′Y (10)
The estimator ρˆ(λˆ, α) with a choice of α > 0 establishes a floor on the singular values of
the matrix Γ.
In the case of the ACL, Corollary 1 can be leveraged to show that α > 0 allows
the estimator to make use of the full support of Zi, rather than just the two points Z¯
and Z. But ridge regression comes at the expense of some bias. Proposition 10 below
yields a means of navigating this trade-off to choose α in practice. In particular, I
propose choosing α to minimize a feasible estimator of the conditional MSE E[(ρˆ(λ, α)−
∆c)
2|Z1 . . . Zn].
Proposition 10. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, E[(ρˆ(λ, α) −∆c)2|Z1 . . . Zn] is,
up to second order in estimation error and a positive constant of proportionality:
λ˜′(Γ′Γ + αI)−1
{
Γ′(ΩY + ∆2cΩD − 2∆cΩY D)Γ
+α2(βY β
′
Y + ∆
2
cβDβ
′
D − 2∆cβY β′D)
}
(Γ′Γ + αI)−1λ˜ (11)
where λ˜ := (0, λ′)′, βY := E[ΓiΓ′i]
−1E[ΓiYi], βD := E[ΓiΓ′i]
−1E[ΓiDi], and ΩVW = E[(V −
βV Γ)(W − βWΓ)′|Γ] for V,W ∈ {Y,D}, and all expectations are assumed to exist.
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Furthermore, if αˆmse is chosen as the smallest positive local minimizer of the following
estimate of the above:
Mˆ(α) := (0, λˆ′)(Γ′Γ + αI)−1
{
nΠˆ + α2(βˆβˆ′)
}
(Γ′Γ + αI)−1(0, λˆ′)′
with βˆV := (Γ
′Γ)−1Γ′V for each V ∈ {Y,D}, Πˆ := 1
n
∑
i(Yi − βˆY Γi − (0,λˆ
′)βˆY
(0,λˆ′)βˆD
(Di −
βˆDΓi))
2ΓiΓ
′
i and βˆ := βˆY − (0,λˆ
′)βˆY
(0,λˆ′)βˆD
βˆD then
αˆmse/
√
n
p→ 0
provided that λˆ
p→ λ, (0, λ′)Σ−1(βY + ∆cβD) 6= 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The proposed data-driven choice αˆmse estimates the unknown quantities in Eq. (11)
based on an initial guess of α = 0, and then minimizes with respect to α. This can be
seen as a “one-step” version of a more general iterative algorithm in which a value αt is
used to compute the function Mˆ(α), which is then minimized to find αt+1 and so on until
convergence. I implement the single-step version in Appendix C, and find that it indeed
improves estimation error considerably for the simulation DGPs considered.
The reason that my proposed rule evaluates αˆmse as a local minimizer of Mˆ(α) rather
than a global minimizer, is that the function Mˆ(α) is always positive but approaches
zero as α → ∞. This stands in contrast with the standard case of ridge regression in
which regularization bias always grows with α, eventually dominating any efficiency gains
from increasing it further. In the present case, the vector βˆ as defined above and (0, λˆ′)′
are orthogonal (in sample as well as in the population limit), and thus the “(squared)
bias” term vanishes as α→∞, along with the variance of the regularized estimator (this
is roughly analogous to ridge regularizing a vector of regression coefficients when their
true values are all zero). Nevertheless, the function Mˆ(α) does have a well-defined local
minimum that achieves a lower value than Mˆ(0) at some strictly positive α (see Appendix
D for details), and this local minimum is shown to provide a helpful guide to choosing α
in the simulations of Appendix C. Note that the condition (0, λ′)Σ−1(βY + ∆cβD) 6= 0 in
Proposition 10 rules out a knife-edge case in which the Hessian of Mˆ(α) is zero when the
other arguments of Mˆ are evaluated at their probability limits.
C.2 Asymptotic distribution
Consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator ρˆ(λˆ, α) follows in a straightfor-
ward way from the results thus far. In particular, with α = 0 the asymptotic variance
can be computed as a special case of Theorem 3 in Imbens and Angrist (1994). In our
setting, we can view estimation of h(z) as a parametric problem h(z) = g(z, θ) where the
parameter vector θ is the mean and variance of Γi, along with the vector λ:
θ = (µΓ,Σ, λ)
′ = ({µΓ,l}l, {Σlm}l≤m, {λ}l)′ with l,m ∈ {1 . . . |F|}
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Then ρˆ(λ, α) = Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Yi)/Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Di), where θˆ solves a set of moment con-
ditions
∑N
i=1 ψ(Zi, θˆ) = 0 given explicitly in the theorem below.
Theorem 2 below allows αn > 0 provided that the sequence converges in probability
to zero at a sufficient rate. By Proposition 10, we obtain this rate for the “one-step”
minimizer of the feasible MSE estimate given in Eq. (11).
Theorem 2. Under the Assumptions of Theorem 1, if αn = op(
√
n) then
√
n(ρˆ(λˆ, αn)−∆c) d→ N(0, V )
where V = e1
′Π−1Ω(Π′)−1e1 (i.e. the top-left element of Π−1Ω(Π′)−1) with:
Ω =
−E[Dig(Zi, θ)] −E[g(Zi, θ)] E[Uidθg(Zi, θ)]−E[Di] −1 0
0 0 E[dθ′ψ(Zi, θ)]

Π =
 E[g(Zi, θ)
2] E[g(Zi, θ)Ui] E[g(Zi, θ)ψ(Zi, θ)]
′
E[g(Zi, θ)Ui] E[U
2
i ] E[Uiψ(Zi, θ)]
′
E[g(Zi, θ)Uiψ(Zi, θ)] E[Uiψ(Zi, θ)] E[ψ(Zi, θ)ψ(Zi, θ)
′]

so long as Ω and Π are finite and Π has full rank, with the definitions:
Ui := Yi − E[Yi]−∆c(Di − E[Di])
θ = (µΓ,Σ, λ)
′ = ({µΓ,l}l, {Σlm}l≤m, {λ}l)′
g(z, θ) = λ′Σ−1(Γ(Zi)− µΓ)
ψ(Zi, θ) = ((Γ(Zi)− µΓ)′, {(Γl(Zi)− µΓ,l)(Γm(Zi)− µΓ,m)− Σlm}l≤m, {cl(Zi)− λl}l)′
Here Γ(Zi) = (Γ1(Zi) . . .Γ|F|(Zi))′ where Γ(Zi)l = ZSl,i for some arbitrary ordering Sl
of the sets in F , and cl(z) = c(g(Sl), z) (and thus P (Ci = 1|Gi = g(Sl)) = E[cl(Zi)]).
Proof. See Appendix D.
C.3 Simulation study
This section reports a Monte Carlo experiment in which the regularized estimator pro-
posed above is compared against its unregularized version and 2SLS. I proceed in two
steps. In a first simulation involving three binary instruments, I demonstrate the prac-
tical importance of regularization. A second simulation with two binary instruments
highlights the potential dangers of using 2SLS.
Three instrument DGP:
We first let J = 3, and put equal weight P (Gi = g) = .05 over each of the 20 compliance
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groups. To introduce endogeneity, I let Yi(0) = Gi · Ui where the Gi are numbered
arbitrarily from one to 20 and Ui ∼ Unif [0, 1]. The treatment effect within each group
g is chosen to be constant and equal to g, so that
Yi(1) = Yi(0) +Gi + Vi
with Vi ∼ Unif [0, 1]. With this setup, ACL = 10.
For the joint distribution of the instruments, I consider two alternatives, meant to
capture different extremes regarding statistical dependence among the instruments:
1. (Z1i, Z2i, Z3i) generated as uncorrelated coin tosses
2. (1) followed by the following transformation: if Z2i = 1 set Z3i = 0 with probability
95%
I let the sample size be n = 1000, and perform one thousand simulations. Our primary
goal is to compare the estimator ρˆ(1, 1, . . . , 1, α), where α chosen by the feasible approxi-
mate MSE minimizing procedure described in Section 5, to the simple Wald estimator of
ACL (Eˆ[Yi|Zi = (111)]− Eˆ[Yi|Zi = (000)])/(Eˆ[Di|Zi = (111)]− Eˆ[Di|Zi = (000)]), which
is equal to ρˆ(1 . . . 1, α = 0). I also benchmark both estimators against fully saturated
2SLS. I stress that 2SLS is not generally consistent for the ACL (or any convex combina-
tion of treatment effects) under vector monotonicity. Nevertheless, given the popularity
of 2SLS and its desirable properties under traditional LATE monotonicity, it is important
to know if and when the proposed estimator ρˆ(λ, α) outperforms 2SLS in practice.
Figure 4 shows the results for the first DGP, where the Zj are independent Bernoulli
random variables with mean 1/2. We see that with the good overlap of the points
Z¯ = (1, 1, 1) and Z¯ = (0, 0, 0) (which are each equal to 1/8), the Wald estimator performs
well. For this DGP, the procedure to choose αˆmse, minimizing MSE, results in small values
with high probability. Hence the regularized estimator ρˆ((1, 1, . . . 1)′, αˆmse) according to
Proposition 10 is very close to the Wald estimator (recall that they are identical when
α = 0). However, my estimator does deliver a slightly smaller RMSE, as expected, at the
cost of some bias. Fully saturated 2SLS happens to also perform well for this DGP.
Figure 4: Monte Carlo distributions of estimators, for the first DGP (Z uncorrelated coin tosses) with three
binary instruments. “Reg. Est.” indicates ρˆ(1, . . . , 1, αˆmse). The vertical line shows the true value of ACL.
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Figure 5 shows the results for the second DGP, where I modify the joint distribution of
(Z1, Z2, Z3) to impose E(Z3i|Z2i = 1) = 0.05. In this case, the Wald estimator performs
comparatively poorly. We see that regularizing the estimator to use the full sample rather
than just the points Z¯ = (1, 1, 1) and Z¯ = (0, 0, 0) can help considerably.
Figure 5: Monte Carlo distributions of estimators, for the first DGP (P (Z3i|Z2i = 1) = 0.05) with three binary
instruments. “Reg. Est.” indicates ρˆ(1, . . . , 1, αˆmse). The vertical line shows the true value of ACL.
Two instrument DGP:
Note that in both Figures 4 and 5, fully saturated 2SLS (regression on the propensity
score) performs well, in the latter case actually outperforming both of the alternative
estimators. This is despite the fact that it is not consistent for the ACL, and is in
general not even guaranteed to be consistent for ∆c for any choice of the function c(g, z).
To demonstrate that 2SLS can in practice perform very poorly under vector monotonicity,
I below report results from an additional simulation in which J = 2.
For this simulation, the DGP is as follows. Among the six possible compliance groups
under vector monotonicity, I give units a 90% chance of being Z1 complier and a 10%
chance of Z2 complier. The treatment effect is set to 2 for Z1 compliers, and −8 for
Z2 compliers, resulting in a ACL of unity. I generate negatively correlated binary in-
struments (with correlation of about −.1) from a multivariate normal. In particular,
with (
Z∗1
Z∗2
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
[
1 −.8
−.8 1
]]
I set Z1i = 1 when Z
∗
1i is over its median and Z2i = 1 when Z
∗
2i is over its median. I again
let the sample size be n = 1000, and perform a thousand simulations.
Figure 6 shows that in this case, 2SLS is indeed outside of the convex hull of treat-
ment effects, despite having high precision. The proposed regularized estimator clearly
outperforms both of the alternatives for this DGP.
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Figure 6: Monte Carlo distributions of estimators, for the two-instrument DGP. “Reg. Est.” indicates
ρˆ(1, . . . , 1, αˆmse). The vertical line shows the true value of ACL.
D Proofs
This section provides proofs for the formal results presented in the body of the paper.
D.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify notation take each ordering ≥j to be the ordering on the natural numbers ≥,
without loss. The two versions of VM are:
Assumption VM (vector monotonicity). For z, z′ ∈ Z, if z ≥ z′ component-wise,
then P (Di(z) ≥ Di(z′)) = 1
Assumption VM’ (alternative characterization). P (Di(zj, z−j) ≥ Di(z′j, z−j)) = 1
when zj ≥ z′j and both (zj, z−j) and (z′j, z−j) ∈ Z
The claim is that VM ⇐⇒ VM ′.
• VM =⇒ VM′ : immediate, since (zj, z−j) ≥ (z′j, z−j) in a vector sense when zj ≥ z′j
• VM′ =⇒ VM : consider z, z′ ∈ Z such that z ≥ z′ in a vector sense, i.e. zj ≥ z′j
for all j ∈ {1 . . . J}. Then by VM ′ and connectedness of Z, then for some ordering
of the instrument labels 1 . . . J :
P
Di

z1
z2
...
zJ
 ≥ Di

z′1
z2
...
zJ

 = 1 P
Di

z′1
z2
...
zJ
 ≥ Di

z′1
z′2
...
zJ

 = 1 etc . . .
and thus:
P
Di

z1
z2
...
zJ
 ≥ Di

z′1
z2
...
zJ
 ≥ Di

z′1
z′2
...
zJ
 ≥ · · · ≥ Di

z′1
z′2
...
z′J

 = 1
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D.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let P (z) := E[Di|Zi = z] be the propensity score function. By the law of iterated
expectations and Assumption 1:
P (z) =
∑
g∈G
P (Gi = g|Zi = z)E[Di(Zi)|Gi = g, Zi = z] =
∑
g∈G
P (Gi = g)Dg(z)
By VM, Dg(z) is component-wise monotonic for any g in the support of Gi. As a convex
combination of component-wise monotonic functions, P (z) will thus also be component-
wise monotonic.
In the other direction, note that by PM if P (zj, z−j) > P (z′j, z−j), then we must have
that P (Di(zj, z−j) ≥ Di(z′j, z−j)) = 1. Thus component-wise monotonicity of P (z) with
respect to some collection of orderings {≥j}j∈{1...J} implies P (Di(zj, z−j) ≥ Di(z′j, z−j)) =
1 for all choices of j ∈ {1 . . . J}, zj ≥j z′j and z−j ∈ Z−j. This is the equivalent form of
VM stated in Proposition 1.
D.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let Z˜ be the set of possible values for the new set of instruments (Z˜2, . . . Z˜m, Z−1). Since
P (Z˜mi = 0 & Z˜ni = 1) = 0 for any m > n, we can take Z˜ to only consist of cases where
for all m: Z˜−m is composed of all zeros for the first m − 1 entries, and then ones for
m+ 1 . . .M . Note that fixing Z1 is equivalent to fixing Z˜2 . . . Z˜M .
If Z is connected, then the Z˜ given above is connected. Then, by Proposition 1, we sim-
ply need to show that for any Z−1 = (Z2, . . . , ZJ) and Z˜−m = (Z˜2, . . . , Z˜m, Z˜m+1, . . . , Z˜M)
such that (0, Z˜−m, Z−1) ∈ Z and (1, Z˜−m, Z−1) ∈ Z:
Di(1, Z˜−m;Z−1) ≥ Di(0, Z˜−m;Z−1)
where the notation Di(a, b; c) is understood as Di(d, c) where d is the value of Z1 corre-
sponding to Z˜ with value a for Z˜m and b for Z˜−m. For any Z˜−m satisfying (0, Z˜−m, Z−1) ∈
Z and (1, Z˜−m, Z−1) ∈ Z, switching Z˜m from zero to ones corresponds to switching Z1
from value zm−1 to value zm. Since
Di(1, Z˜−m;Z−1)−Di(0, Z˜−m;Z−1) = Di(zm, Z−1)−Di(zm−1, Z−1) ≥ 0
by vector monotonicity on the original vector (Z1 . . . ZJ), the result now follows.
D.4 Proof of Proposition 3
For any fixed z, write the condition Dg(F )(z) = 1 as{Dg(F )(z) = 1} ⇐⇒ {⋃
S∈F
{Dg(S)(z) = 1}} ⇐⇒ not {⋂
S∈F
{Dg(S)(z) = 0}}
which can be written as
Dg(z) = 1−
∏
S∈F
(
1−Dg(S)(z)
)
=
∑
f⊆F :f 6=∅
(−1)|f |+1
∏
S∈F
Dg(S)(z)
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Let z(z) = {j ∈ {1 . . . J} : zj = 1} represent z as the subset of instrument indices for
which the associated instrument takes the value of one. Then, using that for a simple
compliance group Dg(S)(z) = 1(S ⊆ z(z)):
Dg(z) =
∑
f⊆F :f 6=∅
(−1)|f |+1
∏
s∈F
Dg(S)(z)
=
∑
f⊆F :f 6=∅
(−1)|f |+1 · Dg((⋃S∈f S))(z)
=
∑
f⊆F :f 6=∅
(−1)|f |+1 · 1
((⋃
S∈f
S
)
⊆ z(z)
)
=
∑
∅⊂f⊆F :
(
⋃
S∈f S)⊆z(z)
(−1)|f |+1 =
∑
S′⊆z(z)
∑
∅⊂f⊆F :
(
⋃
S∈f S)=S′
(−1)|f |+1
=
∑
S′⊆{1...J}
1 (S ′ ⊆ z(z))
∑
∅⊂f⊆F :
(
⋃
S∈f S)=S′
(−1)|f |+1
=
∑
S′⊆{1...J}
 ∑∅⊂f⊆F :
(
⋃
S∈f S)=S′
(−1)|f |+1
Dg(S′)(z) = ∑∅⊂S′⊆{1...J}
 ∑
f⊆F :
(
⋃
S∈f S)=S′
(−1)|f |+1
Dg(S′)(z)
Thus, letting s(F, S ′) :=
{
f ⊆ F :
(⋃
S∈f S
)
= S ′
}
, we haveDg(F )(z) =
∑
S′ [MJ ]F,S′Dg(S)(z),
where the sum ranges over non-null subsets of the instruments ∅ ⊂ S ′ ⊆ {1 . . . J} and
[MJ ]F,S′ =
∑
f∈s(F,S′)(−1)|f |+1.
D.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Any indicator 1(Zi = z) for a value z ∈ {0, 1}J can be expanded out as a polynomial in
the instrument indicators as 1(Zi = z) =
∏
j∈z1 Zji
∏
j∈z0(1−Zji) =
∑
f⊆z0(−1)|f |Z(z1∪f),i,
where (z1, z0) is a partition of the indices j ∈ {1 . . . J} that take a value of zero or one in
z, respectively. With J = 2 for example,
((1− Z1i)(1− Z2i), Z1i(1− Z2i), Z2i(1− Z1i), Z1iZ2i) = (1, Z1i, Z2i, Z1iZ2i)A = (1,Γ′i)A
where A =

1 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0
1 −1 −1 1
. Denote the random vector of such indicators Zi. Then
(1,Γ′i)A = Z
′
i, with the matrix of coefficients AS,z =
∑
f⊆z0
(z1∪f)=S
(−1)|f |. The matrix A so
defined must be invertible, because any product of the instruments ZSi for S ⊆ {1 . . . J}
can similarly be expressed as a linear combination of the components of Zi, where we
define Z∅i = 1. Specifically, ZSi =
∑
z∈Z 1 (∀j∈S, zj = 1)1(Zi = z).
Consider the matrix
Σ∗ := E[(1,Γ′i)
′(1,Γ′i)] = A
′−1E[ZiZ′i]A
−1 = A′−1diag{P (Zi = z)}A−1
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where E[ZiZ
′
i] is diagonal since the events that Zi take on two different values are exclu-
sive. Since A−1 exists, the rank of Σ∗ must be equal to the rank of diag{P (Zi = z)},
which is in turn equal to the cardinality of Z. Assumption 3 thus holds if and only if
Σ∗ has full rank of 2J . Note that although A−1 diagonalizes the matrix Σ∗, it does not
provide its eigen-decomposition, as A−1 6= A′ (A is not orthogonal).
Now we prove that Σ∗ has full rank whenever Σ has full rank, and vice versa. Note
that Σ = V ar(Γi) has full rank if and only if ω
′E[(Γi − EΓi)(Γi − EΓi)]ω = E[ω′(Γi −
EΓi)(Γi − EΓi)ω] > 0, i.e. P (ω′(Γi − EΓi) = 0) < 1 for any ω ∈ R2J−1/0. Similarly
Σ∗ has full rank if P ((ω0, ω)′((1,Γi) = 0) < 1 for any ω0 ∈ R, ω ∈ R2J−1 where (ω0, ω)
is not the zero vector in R2
J
. But if for some ω, ω′(Γi − EΓi) = 0 w.p.1., then we
also have (ω0, ω)
′(1,Γi) = 0 w.p.1. by choosing ω0 = −ω′E[Γi]. In the other direction,
note that (ω0, ω)
′(1,Γi) = 0 w.p.1. implies that ω′Γi = −ω0 and hence ω′(Γi − EΓi) =
−ω0 − ω′EΓi = −ω0 − E[ω′Γi] = −ω0 + ω0 = 0.
D.6 Proof of the Appendix A Proposition
Introduce the notation that unionsq indicates inclusion of a new set among a family of sets
(while ∪ continues to indicate taking the union of elements across sets).
For any S ⊆M that contains both Zjm and Zjm′ for some j and m < m′, g(F unionsqS) and
g(F unionsqS/{Zjm}) generate the same selection behavior for any Sperner family F on all of Z
(this can be seen by mapping the implied selection behavior back to the original discrete
instrument Zj). Thus, we can take G to exclude such S without loss of generality.
Now, consider the family F of all S ⊂ M that contain at most one Zjm for any
given j. By the above, this choice of F satisfies Assumption 3b*. Suppose it did not
satisfy Assumption 3a*. Then, there would need to exist a non-zero vector ω such that
P
(∑
S∈F ωSZSi = 0
)
= 1 with ZSi :=
∏
(j,m)∈S Z˜
j
m. This would imply non-invertibility
of Σ∗ := E[(1,Γi)(1,Γi)′], where Γi := {ZSi}S∈F ,S 6=∅ by the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 1 (Γi and a vector of indicators for all z ∈ Z are each related by an
invertible linear map), which in turn contradicts the assumption of full support. Note
that invertibility of Σ∗ is again equivalent to invertibility of V ar(Γi) as before.
D.7 Proof of Theorem 1
We first note that any measurable function f(Y ) preserves Assumption 1, that is
(f(Yi(1)), f(Yi(0)), Gi) ⊥ Zi
and Assumptions 2-3 are unaffected by such a transformation to the outcome variable.
Thus, we continue without loss with Yi, Yi(1) and Yi(0) possibly redefined as f(Yi),
f(Yi(1)) and f(Yi(0)) respectively.
Note that the function h(·) given in Theorem 1 has the property that E[h(Zi)] = 0,
for any distribution of the instruments. Consider the quantity E[YiDih(Zi)] for a func-
tion h having this property. By the law of iterated expectations, and the independence
43
assumption:
E[YiDih(Zi)] =
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[YiDih(Zi)|Gi = g]
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[Yi(1)Dg(Zi)h(Zi)|Gi = g]
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[Yi(1)|Gi = g]E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)] (12)
where Dg(z) denotes the selection function for compliance group g. Similarly,
E[Yi(1−Di)h(Zi)] =
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[Yi(0)(1−Di)h(Zi)|Gi = g]
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g) {E[Yi(0)|Gi = g]E[h(Zi)]
−E[Yi(0)|Gi = g]E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)]}
=
∑
g
−P (Gi = g)E[Yi(0)|Gi = g]E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)] (13)
where we have used that Zi ⊥ (Yi(0), Zi) and E[h(Zi)] = 0.
Combining these two results:
E[Yih(Zi)] = E[YiDih(Zi)]+E[Yi(1−Di)h(Zi)] =
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)]∆g (14)
where ∆g := E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Gi = g]. By the law of iterated expectations, we also have
that
E[Dih(Zi)] =
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)] (15)
Note that in all of Equations (12), (13) and (14), the weighing over various groups g is
governed by the quantity E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)]. It can be seen that never takers and always
takers receive no weight, since E[Dn.t(Zi)h(Zi)] = E[0] = 0 and since E[Da.t(Zi)h(Zi)] =
E[h(Zi)] = 0.
Let F denote the set of non-empty subsets of the instrument indices: F := {S ⊆
{1, 2, . . . J}, S 6= ∅}, and recall that these correspond each to a simple compliance group
g(S), where Dg(S)(Zi) = ZSi. I first show that for any λ ∈ R|F|, Assumption 3 allows
us to define an h(Zi) such that E[Dg(S)(Zi)h(Zi)] = E[ZSih(Zi)] = λS. Note that since
E[h(Zi)] = 0, this is the same as tuning each covariance Cov(ZSi, h(Zi)) to λS (c.f.
Proposition 5). In particular, consider the choice h(Zi) = (Γi−E[Γi])′Σ−1λ, where recall
that Γi is a vector of ZSi for each S ∈ F .
(E[h(Zi)i,Γi1], E[h(Zi),Γi2], . . . , E[h(Zi),Γik])
′ = E[(Γi − E[Γi])h(Zi)]
= E[(Γi − E[Γi])(Γi − E[Γi])′]Σ−1λ
= ΣΣ−1λ = λ
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We can understand the algebra of this result as follows. Let V = span({ZSi−E[ZSi]}S∈F).
V is a subspace of the vector space V of random variables on Z, with the zero vec-
tor being a degenerate random variable equal to zero. Since the matrix Σ is pos-
itive semidefinite by construction, Assumption 3 is equivalent to the statement that
for all ω ∈ R|F|/0, ω′E[(Γi − E[Γi])(Γi − E[Γi])′]ω = E[|ω′(Γi − E[Γi])|2] > 0: i.e.
P
(∑
S∈F ωS(ZSi − E[ZSi])) = 0
)
< 1 for all ω ∈ R|F|/0. In other words, the random
variables (ZSi−E[ZSi]) for S ∈ F are linearly independent, and hence form a basis of V .
Since V is finite dimensional, there exists an orthonormal basis of random vectors of the
same cardinality, |F|, where orthonormality is defined with respect to the expectation
inner product: 〈A,B〉 := E[AiBi]. It is this orthogonalized version of the ZSi that affords
the ability to separately tune each of the E[h(Zi)ZSi] to the desired value λS, without
disrupting the others.
Note that under Assumption 1:
∆c =
∑
g∈G
{
P (Gi = g)P (Ci = 1|Gi = g)
P (Ci = 1)
}
·∆g =
∑
g∈G P (Gi = g)P (Ci = 1|Gi = g) ·∆g∑
g∈G P (Gi = g)P (Ci = 1|Gi = g)
Comparing with Equations (14) and (15), the equality ∆c = E[h(Zi)Yi]/E[Dih(Zi)] fol-
lows (provided that P (Ci = 1) > 0) if the coefficients match. That is: E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)] =
P (Ci = 1|Gi = g), for all g ∈ Gc. By the above, this is guaranteed under Property M if
we choose λS = P (Ci = 1|Gi = g(S)) = E[c(g(S), Zi)], since the quantity E[Dg(Zi)h(Zi)]
appearing in Eq. (14) is linear in Dg(Zi). The same logic follows for causal parameters
of the form E[Yi(d)|Ci = 1] for d ∈ {0, 1}, using Equations (12) and (13) and
E[Yi(d)|Ci = 1] =
∑
g∈G
P (Gi = g|Ci = 1)E[Yi(d)|Gi = g, c(g, Zi) = 1]
= P (Ci = 1)
−1∑
g∈G
P (Gi = g)P (Ci = 1|Gi = g)E[Yi(d)|Gi = g]
by independence. Note that the quantity λS for each S can be computed from the ob-
served distribution of Z.
To replace Assumption 3 with Assumption 3* from Appendix A, simply replace F as
defined here with a maximal F from Assumption 3a*.
D.8 Proof of Corollary 1 to Theorem 1
The proof of Lemma 1 shows that (1,Γ′i)A is a vector of indicators Z
′
i for values of Z,
where A is the matrix with entries given in Corollary 1, which is invertible, and Zi is a
vector of indicators 1(Zi = z) for each of the values z ∈ Z. We can thus write h(Zi) from
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Theorem 1 as
h(Zi) = λ
′Σ−1(Γi − E[Γi]) = (0, λ′)E[(1,Γ′i)′(1,Γ′i)]−1(1,Γ′i)′
= (0, λ′)E[A′−1A′(1,Γ′i)
′(1,Γ′i)AA
−1]−1A′−1Zi
= (0, λ′)AE[ZiZ′i]Zi
This is useful because E[ZiZ
′
i] is diagonal, since the events that Zi take on two different
values are exclusive: E[ZiZ
′
i] = diag{P (Zi = z)}z∈Z .
Now, for V ∈ {Y,D}, E[h(z)Vi] = (0, λ′)Adiag{P (Zi = z)}−1z∈Z{E[1(Zi = z)Vi]}z∈Z =
(0, λ′)A{E[Vi|Zi = z]}z∈Z . Thus (0, λ′)A describes the coefficients in an expansion of
E[h(z)Vi] into CEFs of Vi across the support of Zi.
D.9 Proof of Proposition 6
D.9.1 VM case
The if direction is most straightforward. From Proposition 3 we have that for any z ∈ Z
and g ∈ Gc:
Dg(z) =
∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
[MJ ]F (g),S · Dg(S)(z)
Thus, for any such c(g, z):
c(g, z) =
K∑
k=1
∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
[MJ ]F (g),S · Dg(S)(hk(z)))−
∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
[MJ ]F (g),S · Dg(S)(lk(z)))
=
∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
[MJ ]F (g),S ·
{
K∑
k=1
Dg(S)(hk(z)))−Dg(S)(lk(z)))
}
=
∑
S⊆{1...J},S 6=∅
[MJ ]F (g),S · c(g(S), z)
for any z ∈ Z. To finish verifying Property M, we need only observe that c(a.t., z) =
c(n.t., z) = 0 for all z since Dg(hk(z)) = Dg(lk(z)) for any hk, lk when g ∈ {a.t., n.t.}.
Now we turn to the other implication of the Proposition, that any c satisfying Property
M has a representation like the above. For shorthand, let c−1(z) indicate the family of
S ⊆ {1 . . . J} such that c(g(S), z) = 1. The following Lemma establishes that the family
c−1(z) and its complement are each closed under unions:
Lemma. Let c be a function from G×Z to {0, 1} satisfies Property M. If A ∈ c−1(z) and
B ∈ c−1(z), then A∪B ∈ c−1(z), and if A /∈ c−1(z) and B /∈ c−1(z), then A∪B /∈ c−1(z).
Proof. If the sets A and B are nested, then the result follows trivially. Now suppose
neither set contains the other, and consider the Sperner family AunionsqB constructed of the
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two sets A and B. By Property M and using Proposition 3:
c(g(A unionsqB), z) =
∑
∅⊂S′⊆{1...J}
 ∑
f⊆{A,B}:
(
⋃
S∈f S)=S′
(−1)|f |+1
 c
(⋃
S∈f
S, z
)
=
∑
∅⊂f⊆{A,B}
c
(⋃
S∈f
S, z
)
= c(g(A), z) + c(g(B), z)− c(g(A ∪B), z)
In the first case, if both A and B are in c−1(z), then we must have c(g(A ∪ B), z) = 1
to prevent c(g(A unionsq B), z) from evaluating to 2, which contradicts the assumption that c
takes values in {0, 1}. In the second case, when both c(g(A), z) and c(g(B), z) are zero,
we must have c(g(A ∪B), z) = 1 to prevent c(g(A unionsqB), z) from evaluating to -1.
As a consequence of the Lemma, since c−1(z) is a finite set, there exists a member S1(z)
of c−1(z) that satisfies S1(z) =
⋃
S∈c−1(z) S (similarly, there exists a S0(z) =
⋃
S/∈c−1(z) S
with S0(z) /∈ c−1(z)). All members of the family c−1(z) are subsets of S1(z), and all
S ⊆ {1 . . . J} that are not in c−1(z) are subsets of S0(z).
Let z take some fixed value, and beginning with the set S1 = S1(z), define a sequence
of sets {S1, S2, S3, . . . } as follows:
S2k =
⋃
S′⊆S2k−1:
S′ /∈c−1(z)
S ′ and S2k+1 =
⋃
S′⊆S2k:
S′∈c−1(z)
S ′
where we take
⋃
S′∈∅ S
′ to evaluate to the empty set. This sequence provides a charac-
terization of the family c−1(z) as follows. For any ∅ ⊂ S ⊆ {1 . . . J}:
c(g(S), z) = 1(S ∈ c−1(z))
= 1(S ⊆ S1 : S ∈ c−1(z))
= 1(S ⊆ S1)− 1(S ⊆ S1 : S /∈ c−1(z))
= 1(S ⊆ S1)−
(
1(S ⊆ S2)− 1(S ⊆ S2 : S ∈ c−1(z))
)
= 1(S ⊆ S1)− 1(S ⊆ S2) +
(
1(S ⊆ S3)− 1(S ⊆ S3 : S /∈ c−1(z))
)
= . . .
=
N∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 · 1(S ⊆ Sn) + (−1)N ·
1(S ⊆ SN : S ∈ c−1(z)) if N even1(S ⊆ SN : S /∈ c−1(z)) if N odd
for any natural number N .
Think of the power set of S1 as a “first-order” approximation to the family c
−1(z).
However, in most cases this family is too large, as there will be subsets of S1 that are not
found in c−1(z). Define S2 to be the union of all such offending sets. The power set of
S2 now provides a possible “overestimate” of the family of offending sets (since they are
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all in 2S2) and hence removing all subsets of S2 as a correction to be applied to 2
S1 as an
estimate of c−2(z) will overcompensate: we will have removed some sets which are indeed
in c−1(z). We thus define S3 analogously, whose power set provides an approximation to
the error in S2 as an approximation to the error in S1, and so on.
Does this process of over-correction eventually terminate, so that the final remainder
term is zero? Note that for any n: Sn ⊆ Sn−1. If Sn = Sn−1 6= ∅, then we have a fixed
point S where
⋃
S′⊆S:S′∈c−1(z) S
′ =
⋃
S′⊆S:S′ /∈c−1(z) S
′. But by the Lemma, this would imply
that S is a member both of {S ′ ⊆ S : S ′ ∈ c−1(z)} and of {S ′ ⊆ S : S ′ /∈ c−1(z)}, and
therefore that both c(g(S), z) = 1 and c(g(S), z) = 0, a contradiction. Thus, Sn ⊂ Sn−1,
and |Sn| is a decreasing sequence of non-negative integers that is strictly decreasing so
long as |Sn| > 0. It must thus converge to zero in at most |S1| iterations, so that Sn = ∅
for all n ≥ |S1|.
Without loss, we can terminate the sequence on an even term, since 1(S ⊆ ∅) = 0 for
any S ⊃ ∅. Let 2K denote the smallest even number such that Sn = ∅ for all n > 2K,
for a fixed z. Thus, we have for any ∅ ⊂ S ⊆ {1 . . . J}:
c(g(S), z) =
2K∑
n=1
(−1)n+1 · Dg(S)(Sn) =
K∑
k=1
Dg(S)(S2k−1)−Dg(S)(S2k)
where 2K ≤ |S1| ≤ J , and we have used that Dg(S)(S ′) = 1(S ⊂ S ′) for any S ′.
Now recall that we have left the dependence of each of the sets Sn (as well as the
integer K) on z implicit, and have also adopted the notational convention of Dg(S) as
a shorthand for Dg(z) where z is a point in Z that takes a value of one for exactly
the instruments in the set S. To obtain the notation of the final result, define for each
k = 1 . . . K the point uk(z) ∈ Z to have a value of one exactly for the elements in S2k−1
for that value of z, and lk(z) ∈ Z to have a value of one exactly for the elements in S2k
for that value of z. We may thus write, for any ∅ ⊂ S ⊆ {1 . . . J} and any z ∈ Z:
c(g(S), z) =
K(z)∑
k=1
Dg(S)(uk(z))−Dg(S)(lk(z)) =
K∑
k=1
Dg(S)(uk(z))−Dg(S)(lk(z))
where we let K be the maximum of K(z) over the finite set Z, and we define uk(z)
and lk(z) to each be a vector of zeros whenever k > K(z). For each z, the relations
uk(z) ≥ lk(z) and lk(z) ≥ uk+1(z) component-wise now follow from Sn ⊆ Sn+1.
Now we may apply Property M to construct c(g, z) for any of the non-simple compli-
ance groups as well. Recall that Property M says that c(g(F ), z) =
∑
∅⊂S⊆{1...J}[MJ ]F,S ·
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c(g(S), z) for all z, for any Sperner family F . Thus:
c(g(F ), z) =
∑
∅⊂S⊆{1...J}
[MJ ]F,S ·
K∑
k=1
{Dg(S)(uk(z))−Dg(S)(lk(z))}
=
K∑
k=1
{
∑
∅⊂S⊆{1...J}
[MJ ]F,S · Dg(S)(uk(z))} − {
∑
∅⊂S⊆{1...J}
[MJ ]F,S · Dg(S)(lk(z))}
=
K∑
k=1
Dg(F )(uk(z))−Dg(F )(lk(z))
Finally, note thatDg(uk(z)) = Dg(lk(z)) for any g ∈ {a.t., n.t.} so the following expression
holds for all g ∈ G:
c(g, z) =
K∑
k=1
Dg(uk(z))−Dg(lk(z))
D.9.2 IAM case
Now I prove that representation from Proposition 6 also holds under IAM. Note that
under IAM Property M places no restriction beyond c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0 since there
is no perfect linear dependency between the functions Dg(z) to worry about. Under IAM,
each g ∈ Gc can be associated with an integer m =∈ {1, 2 . . . 2J − 1} and characterized
directly as 1(g = m) = Dg(zm+1) − Dg(z′m), where z1, z2, . . . , z2J is any fixed ordering
of the points that is weakly increasing according to the propensity score E[Di|Zi = zm].
Thus, for any function g : G × Z → {0, 1} such that c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0:
c(g, z) =
2J−1∑
m=1
c(m, z) · (Dg(zm+1)−Dg(z′m))
=
K∑
k=1
Dg(uk(z))−Dg(lk(z))
withK = 2J−1 where for each z we let lk(z) = zm and we let uk(z) =
zk if c(k, z) = 0zk+1 if c(k, z) = 1
.Note that if any set of consecutive c(k, z) = c(k + 1, z) . . . c(k + T, z) are all equal to
one, then one can drop T − 1 of these terms as the inner terms will all cancel leaving
Dg(uk+T (z))−Dg(lk(z)). Thus we may take without loss K ≤ 2J/2 = 2J−1 (corresponding
to the case where c(1, z) = 1, c(2, z) = 0, c(3, z) = 1 etc.).
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D.10 Proof of Corollary 2 to Theorem 1
Using independence and Property M:
E[h(Zi)Di] =
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[h(Zi)Dg(Zi)]
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E
[
h(Zi)
{∑
S
[MJ ]F (g),SDg(s)(Zi)
}]
)
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g)
∑
S
[MJ ]F (g),SP (Ci = 1|Dg(s)(Zi))
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g)P (Ci = 1|Gi = g)
= P (Ci = 1)
D.11 An Equivalence Result
The proofs of Proposition 7 and 9 will make use of the following equivalence result:
Proposition 11. Let the support Z of the instruments be discrete and finite. Fix a
function c(g, z). Let PDZ denote the joint distribution of Di and Zi. Then the following
are equivalent:
1. ∆c is (point) identified by PDZ and {βs}s∈S , for some finite set S of known or
identified (from PDZ) measurable functions s(d, z), and βs := E[s(Di, Zi)Yi]
2. ∆c = βs for a single such s(d, z)
3. ∆c = E[t(Di, Zi, Yi)] with t(d, z, y) a known or identified (from PDZ) measurable
function
4. ∆c is identified from the set of CEFs {E[Yi|Di = d, Zi = z]} for d ∈ {0, 1}, z ∈ Z
along with the joint distribution PDZ
Proof. See Supplemental Material.
In saying that a parameter θ is identified by some set of empirical estimands, I mean that
the set of values of θ that are compatible with the empirical estimands is a singleton,
regardless of the distribution of the latent variables (Gi, Yi(1), Yi(0)) – for all PDZ within
some class (note that the marginal distribution of Gi must also be compatible with PDZ).
For example, by writing the estimand of Theorem 1
∑
z∈Z
P (Zi=z)h(z;PDZ)
E[h(Zi;PDZ)Di] · E[Yi|Zi = z],
where we make explicit that the function h depends on PDZ , it is clear that for any ∆c
satisfying Property M and under Assumptions 1-2, ∆c is identified in the sense of item
4., for all PDZ with the properties: i) the marginal distribution of Zi satisfies Assumption
3; and ii) E[h(Zi;PDZ)Di] > 0.
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D.12 Proof of Proposition 7
By Proposition 11, we know that if ∆c is identified from a finite set of IV-like estimands
and PDZ , it can be written as a single one: ∆c = βs with s(d, z) an identified functional
of PDZ . Now, using that Yi = Yi(0) +Di∆i where ∆i := Yi(1)− Yi(0):
∆c = βs = {E[s(Di, Zi)Yi(0)] + E[s(Di, Zi)Di∆i]}
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g) {E[s(Dg(Zi), Zi)Yi(0)|Gi = g] + E[s(Dg(Zi), Zi)Dg(Zi)∆i|Gi = g]}
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g)
(
((((
(((((E[s Dg(Zi), Zi)]
)
E[Yi(0)|Gi = g]
+
∑
g
P (Gi = g) (E[s(Dg(Zi), Zi)Dg(Zi)])E[∆i|Gi = g]
=
∑
g
P (Gi = g) (E[s(1, Zi)Dg(Zi)]) ∆g
where we’ve used independence, and that the crossed out term must be equal to zero
for every g by the assumption that βs = ∆c for every joint distribution of compliance
groups and potential outcomes compatible with PDZ in some class (it is always possible
to translate the support of the distribution of Yi(0) and Yi(1) by the same constant
without affecting ∆i). Finally, s(Dg(Zi), Zi)Dg(Zi) = s(1, Zi)Dg(Zi) with probability
one, establishing the final equality.
Recall that from Equation (3) that ∆c can also be written as a weighted average of
group-specific average treatment effects ∆g = E[Yi(1)− Yi(0)|Gi = g] as:
∆c =
1
P (Ci = 1)
∑
g
P (Gi = g)E[c(g, Zi)] ·∆g
Since βs = ∆c holds for any vector of {∆g} across all of the g for which P (Gi = g) > 0
is compatible with PDZ , we can match coefficients within this group to establish that
E[c(g, Zi)] = P (Ci = 1)E[s(1, Zi)Dg(Zi)]. This set of weights satisfies Property M, since
for any g ∈ Gc:
E[c(g, Zi)] = P (Ci = 1)E[s(1, Zi)
∑
S
[MJ ]F (g),SDg(S)(Zi)]
=
∑
S
[MJ ]F (g),S
(
P (Ci = 1)E[s(1, Zi)Dg(S)(Zi)]
)
=
∑
S
[MJ ]F (g),S · E[c(Zi, g(S))]
If this holds for any distribution of Zi satisfying Assumption 3, then we must have
c(g, z) =
∑
S[MJ ]F (g),S · c(g(S), z) for all z ∈ Z. To see this, consider a sequence of
distributions for Zi that converges point-wise to a degenerate distribution at any single
point z, but satisfies Assumption 3 for each term in the sequence. Applying the dominated
convergence theorem to E[c(g, Zi)]−
∑
S[MJ ]F (g),S ·E[c(g(S), Zi)] = 0 along this sequence,
we have that c(g, z) =
∑
S[MJ ]F (g),S · c(g(S), z). We can apply a similar argument to
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establish that c(a.t., z) = c(n.t., z) = 0 for all z ∈ Z given that E[c(g, Zi)] = P (Ci =
1)E[s(1, Zi)Dg(Zi)] and E[s(1, Zi)] = 0.
D.13 Proof of Proposition 9
In the Supplemental Material, I show that with two binary instruments, if PM holds
but not VM or IAM, then G consists of seven compliance groups, whose definitions are
given in the Supplemental Material. We suppose that all 7 groups are possibly present,
and the practitioner has knowledge of E[Yi|Di = d, Zi = z] for all eight combinations of
(d, z), as well as the joint distribution of Di and Zi. This is equivalent to knowledge of
E[YiDi|Zi = z] and E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = z] for all z ∈ Z and the joint distribution of (Di, Zi).
Point identification from these moments is in turn equivalent to point identification from
a finite set of IV-like estimands, by Proposition 11.
Using Supplemental Material Table 2, these eight moments can be written in matrix
form as

E[YiDi|Zi = (0, 0)]
E[YiDi|Zi = (0, 1)]
E[YiDi|Zi = (1, 0)]
E[YiDi|Zi = (1, 1)]
E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = (0, 0)]
E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = (0, 1)]
E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = (1, 0)]
E[Yi(1−Di)|Zi = (1, 1)]

=

0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1


podd · E[Yi(1)|Gi = odd]
peager · E[Yi(1)|Gi = eager]
preluct. · E[Yi(1)|Gi = reluct.]
p1 · E[Yi(1)|Gi = 1only]
p2 · E[Yi(1)|Gi = 2only]
pa · E[Yi(1)|Gi = a.t.]
pn · E[Yi(1)|Gi = n.t.]
podd · E[Yi(0)|Gi = odd]
peager · E[Yi(0)|Gi = eager]
preluct. · E[Yi(0)|Gi = reluct.]
p1 · E[Yi(0)|Gi = 1only]
p2 · E[Yi(0)|Gi = 2only]
pa · E[Yi(0)|Gi = a.t.]
pn · E[Yi(0)|Gi = n.t.]

,
for some labeling of the instrument values, where the groups “reluctant defiers” and
“odd compliers” are defined in the Supplemental Material. If this equation is written as
b = Ax, where b is the 8 × 1 vector of identified quantities, and x the 14 × 1 unknown
vector of potential outcome moments (note the matrix A here is not the same as the
matrix A defined in Corollary 1), then ACL can be written as
ACL =
1
1− pa − pn ·
(
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 0
)′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=λ
x (16)
ACL is identified only if the vector λ is in the row space of matrix A (the column space of
A′), which follows from the proof of 4→ 2 in Proposition 11. This can be readily verified
not to hold, since
A′(AA′)−1Aλ ≈
(
1.45 .82 .82 .73 .73 .18 0 −1.45 −.73 −.73 −.82 −.82 0
)
where A′(AA′)−1A is the orthogonal projector into the row space of A (which has full
row rank). Since the RHS of the above is not equal to λ (given explicitly in Eq. 16), λ
is not in the row space of A.
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D.14 Proof of Proposition 10
Write the parameter of interest ∆c as θY /θD, where for V ∈ {Y,D}, θV = λ˜′βV with βV :=
E[ΓiΓ
′
i]
−1E[Γ′iVi] and λ˜ = (0, λ
′)′. Denote the estimator ρˆ(λˆ, α) as ∆ˆc for shorthand. It
takes the form ∆ˆc = θˆY /θˆD, where θˆV := (0, λˆ
′)′(Γ′Γ + K)−1Γ′V , and K = αI. I keep
the notation in terms of K as the first part of the argument below will go through with
any diagonal matrix of positive entries, allowing a different regularization parameter
corresponding to each singular vector of Γ′Γ. Write each θˆV := (0, λˆ′)′βˆ∗V where βˆ
∗
V is the
ridge-regression estimate of βV , and let βˆV = (Γ
′Γ)−1Γ′V be the unregularized regression
coefficient estimator.
Consider the conditional MSE M = E[(∆ˆc −∆c)2|Γ]. It can be rearranged as:
M = E
( θˆY
θˆD
− θY
θD
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ
 = 1
θ2D
E
[(
(θˆY − θY )− ∆ˆc(θˆD − θD)
)2∣∣∣∣Γ]
=
1
θ2D
E
[
(θˆY − θY )2 + ∆ˆ2c(θˆD − θD)2 − 2∆ˆc(θˆY − θY )(θˆD − θD)
∣∣∣Γ] (17)
For any V,W ∈ {Y,D}, and m ≥ 1:
E
[
(∆ˆc)
m(θˆV − θV )(θˆW − θW )
∣∣∣Γ] = E [(∆ˆc)m(0, λˆ)′(βˆ∗V − βV )(βˆ∗W − βW )′(0, λˆ)′∣∣∣Γ]
= (∆c)
mλ˜′E
[
(βˆ∗V − βV )(βˆ∗W − βW )′
∣∣∣Γ] λ˜+Rmn
where the first term in the above is viewed as an approximation that ignores terms that
are of third or higher order in estimation errors. The asymptotic rate at which the
approximation error captured by the Rmn converges to zero is considered explicitly at the
end of this section.
Let Z = (Γ′Γ +K)−1Γ′Γ and notice that βˆ∗V = ZβˆV . Using that E[βˆV |Γ] = βV (as Γi
includes all products of the instruments the CEF must be linear) for V ∈ {Y,D}:
E
[
(βˆ∗V − βV )(βˆ∗W − βW )′
∣∣∣Γ] = ZE [(βˆV − βV )(βˆW − βW )′∣∣∣Γ]Z ′ + (Z − I)βV β′W (Z − I)′
= (Γ′Γ +K)−1(Γ′ΩVWΓ +KβV β′WK)(Γ
′Γ +K)−1
where we define the n × 1 vector UV = V − ΓβV and ΩVW = E[UVU ′W |Γ]. Thus, total
conditional MSE is, by Equation (17):
M ≈ 1
θ2D
λ˜′(Γ′Γ +K)−1
{
Γ′(ΩY + ∆2cΩD − 2∆cΩY D)Γ
+K(βY β
′
Y + ∆
2
cβDβ
′
D − 2∆cβY β′D)K
}
(Γ′Γ +K)−1λ˜
This development follows and generalizes that of Hoerl and Kennard (1970), who con-
sider MSE optimal regularization via ridge regression for estimating a single regression
vector, under homoscedasticity. Our case targets the ratio θˆY /θˆD rather than a vector of
regression coefficients, and also allows for heteroscedasticity.
We now prove that α/
√
n
p→ 0 if α is chosen to minimize the following “single-step”
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estimator of the MSE (ignoring the positive factor of θ−2D that does not depend on K):
Mˆ := λ˜′(Γ′Γ +K)−1
Γ′
ΩˆY +( θˆY
θˆD
)2
ΩˆD − 2
(
θˆY
θˆD
)
ΩˆY D
Γ+
K
βˆY βˆ′Y +
(
θˆY
θˆD
)2
βˆDβˆ
′
D − 2
(
θˆY
θˆD
)
βˆY βˆ
′
D
K
 (Γ′Γ +K)−1λ˜
where
(
θˆY
θˆD
)
is the un-regularized estimator of ∆c. The problem can be re parameterized
as a choice of b := α/n, where
Mˆ(b) := λ˜′
(
Γ′Γ
n
+ bI
)−1
1
n
Γ′
(
ΩˆY +
(
θˆY
θˆD
)2
ΩˆD − 2
(
θˆY
θˆD
)
ΩˆY D
)
Γ
n
+
b2
(
βˆY −
(
θˆY
θˆD
)
βˆD
)(
βˆY −
(
θˆY
θˆD
)
βˆD
)′}(
Γ′Γ
n
+ bI
)−1
λ˜
:= m(b, Πˆ, βˆ, Σˆ, λˆ)
where Πˆ := 1
n
∑
i(UˆY i − θˆY /θˆDUˆDi)2ΓiΓ′i, βˆ := (βˆY − θˆY /θˆDβˆD), and Σˆ∗ := 1n
∑
i ΓiΓ
′
i.
Note that βˆ
p→ β := βY −∆cβD, Σˆ∗ p→ Σ∗ := E[(1,Γ′i)′(1,Γ′i)],
√
n
(
Πˆ− Π
)
d→ N(0, V )
for some V provided that the variance of (UˆY i − θˆY /θˆDUˆDi)2ΓiΓ′i exists, where Π :=
E[(UˆY i − θˆY /θˆDUDi)2ΓiΓ′i]. The function m is
m(b,Π/n, β,Σ∗, λ) = (0, λ′) (Σ∗ + bI)−1
{
Π/n+ b2ββ′
}
(Σ∗ + bI)−1 (0, λ′)′
We wish to show that
√
nb = α/
√
n
p→ 0, when b is chosen as the smallest positive
minimizer of m(·, Πˆ/n, βˆ, Σˆ, λˆ). The strategy will be to show that nb p→ X where X is a
finite degenerate random variable. Since Π and ββ′ are positive definite, it is clear that
m(b,Π/n, β,Σ∗, λ) is weakly positive for any choice of b. Further, m(b,Π/n, β,Σ∗, λ) is
typically strictly positive at b = 0, and it can also be seen that limb→∞m(b,Π/n, β,Σ∗, λ) =
0 (see Section C.1 for discussion). However, m is generally not monotonically decreasing
in between, as we shall see below.
Observe that b = 0 minimizes m(b,0, β,Σ∗, λ) with respect to b regardless of the values
of β,Σ∗, λ, where 0 is a k × k matrix of zeros (the dimension of Π), since m(·) is always
positive and when its second argument vanishes can be made equal to zero by choosing
b = 0. Furthermore, b = 0 is a local minimizer when Π/n = 0, since mb vanishes when
evaluated at (0,0, β,Σ∗, λ)–see below, while the second derivative of m with respect to
b, evaluated at (0,0, β,Σ∗, λ), is equal to
(0, λ′)Σ∗−1ββ′Σ∗−1λ =
(
(0, λ′)Σ∗−1β
)2
up to a strictly positive constant. We have assumed that the quantity in parenthe-
sis is non-zero. By the implicit function theorem, there then exists a unique function
g(Π/n; β,Σ∗, λ) such that g(0; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) = 0 and mb(g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜), βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) = 0, in a
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neighborhood N of the probability limits (0, β,Σ∗, λ) of (Πˆ/n, βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜), and this function
is continuously differentiable with respect to all parameters, (including, in particular, the
elements of Π). Since the second derivative of m is strictly positive at (0,0, βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) and
continuous with respect to all arguments, N can furthermore be chosen such that the
critical point at (g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜), βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) is always a local minimum within N .
Since for any realization of βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜:
mb(0,0, βˆ, Σˆ
∗, λ˜) = 2λ˜′(Σˆ∗ + bI)
−1 {
bI − b2(Σˆ∗ + bI)−1
}
βˆβˆ′(Σˆ∗ + bI)
−1
λ˜
∣∣∣
b=0
= 0
we see that m has a critical point at b = 0 for values (0, βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) of the other arguments.
By uniqueness of the function g(Π/n; β,Σ∗, λ), this implies then that g(0, βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) = 0.
By the mean value theorem, we can write
g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) = g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜)− g(0, βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜)
=
∂
∂x
g(vec(cn−1Πˆ); βˆ, Σˆ∗, λˆ) · vec(Πˆ)
n
for some c ∈ [0, 1], where vec(Π) denotes the vectorization x of the matrix Π, and we let
∂
∂x
g(x; β,Σ∗, λ) denote a gradient of g with respect to that vector (recall that existence
of the derivative is a consequence of the implicit function theorem). By continuity of
∂
∂x
g(x; β,Σ∗, λ) and the continuous mapping theorem then,
n · g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) p→ ∂
∂x
g(0, β,Σ∗, λ)vec(Π) (18)
which is a finite scalar.
To complete the proof, we now simply note that with probability approaching unity,
(Πˆ/n, βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) is within the neighborhood N , and thus if b is chosen as the smallest
positive local minimizer of m(b, Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜) we have that b = g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜). We
have now established the result, since for any B > 0:
P (|α/√n| > B) ≤ P (|α/√n| > B and b = g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜)) + P (b 6= g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜))
= P (|n · g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜)| > √nB) + P (b 6= g(Πˆ/n; βˆ, Σˆ∗, λ˜))
n→ 0 + 0
Finally, I consider the error involved in the approximation made to Equation (17). Write
this as:
Rn := R
m
n +R
m
n =
=
1
θ2D
λ˜′(Γ′Γ +K)−1
{
(∆ˆ2c −∆2c)(Γ′ΩDΓ +KβDβ′DK)
−2(∆ˆc −∆c)(Γ′ΩY DΓ +KβY β′DK)
}
(Γ′Γ +K)−1λ˜
=
1
θ2D · n3/2
· λ˜′
(
Γ′Γ
n
+
K
n
)−1{√
n(∆ˆ2c −∆2c)
(
Γ′ΩDΓ
n
+
K√
n
βDβ
′
D
K√
n
)
−2√n(∆ˆc −∆c)
(
Γ′ΩY DΓ
n
+
K√
n
βY β
′
D
K√
n
)}(
Γ′Γ
n
+
K
n
)−1
λ˜
Provided that α/
√
n
p→ 0 as above, we will show in Theorem 2 that ∆ˆc is
√
n-consistent
for ∆c. In this case, the approximation error term is Op(n
−3/2).
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D.15 Proof of Theorem 2
When αn = 0, the result follows from Theorem 3 of Imbens and Angrist (1994). To see
that op(
√
n) regularization has no asymptotic effect, note that
(0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ + αI)−1Γ′Y = (0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ + αI)−1(Γ′Γ + αI − αI)(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y
= (0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y − α(0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ + αI)−1(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y
and similarly for D, thus:
ρ(λˆ, α) =
(0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y − α(0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ + αI)−1(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′Y
(0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′D − α(0, λˆ′)′(Γ′Γ + αI)−1(Γ′Γ)−1Γ′D
=
Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Yi)− αn(0, λˆ′)′( 1nΓ′Γ + αnI)−1( 1nΓ′Γ)−1 1nΓ′Y
Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Di)− αn(0, λˆ′)′( 1nΓ′Γ + αnI)−1( 1nΓ′Γ)−1 1nΓ′D
=
Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Yi)
Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Di)
+
α
n
·
(0, λˆ′)′( 1
n
Γ′Γ + α
n
I)−1( 1
n
Γ′Γ)−1
{
1
n
Γ′D · Ĉov(g(Zi,θˆ),Yi)
Ĉov(g(Zi,θˆ),Di)
− 1
n
Γ′Y
}
Ĉov(g(Zi, θˆ), Di)− αn(0, λˆ′)′( 1nΓ′Γ + αnI)−1( 1nΓ′Γ)−1 1nΓ′D
and thus the asymptotic distribution of
√
n(ρˆ(λˆ, 0)−∆c) is the same as that of√
n
(
Ĉov(g(Zi,θˆ),Yi)
Ĉov(g(Zi,θˆ),Di)
−∆c
)
, provided that αn/
√
n
p→ 0 (in which case the second term above
is op(n
−1/2)).
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